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Abstract 
 
Neoliberal redevelopment governance has been ascendant worldwide in the last two decades and 
has come to profoundly influence mainstream urban politics. This project seeks to understand 
these formations from a comparative vantage-point, focusing on the global cities of Chicago and 
Buenos Aires. The study critically interrogates these governances to determine the degree to 
which they have significantly different institutional affiliations, operations, and outcomes. At 
issue is an important notion in the theorizing of these governances: contingent neoliberalism. 
While nascent research has suggested the possibility of a strong contingent aspect to these 
governances, its specifics remain under-explored.  
The intellectual merits of this project thus rest on a novel focus: the study of contingent urban 
neoliberalism. Current work on contemporary urban governance in the west, to date, 
peripheralizes the centrality of contingency. Common sets of institutions, interests, programs, 
and motivations are seen to permeate and characterize these governances across the enormous 
diversity of places (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Hackworth, 2007; Peck 2001). My study, in 
contrast, probes the nuances of these features to reveal their rich specifics and place-rooted basis. 
Using a cultural economy frame, my goal is not to marginalize the influence of structures that 
embed within capitalist economies and societies. Indeed, this is a foundational part of my study. 
However, I chronicle the inseparability of local-ness, place rootedness, historical specificity, 
human agency, and political variability that poignantly embeds within the human made operation 
and effects of locally circulating structures.   
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Introduction  
 
Current research within urban political economy has identified the dramatic ascendancy 
of neoliberal governance in cities across the globe (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Peck, Leitner 
and Sheppard, 2007). Its salient characteristics are an emphasis on individualism, the drive to 
privatize state programs and operations, and the attempt to retrench the state with a special 
emphasis on shrinking the welfare state (Jessop, 1998; Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Harvey, 
2006; Peck and Tickell, 2007). Widely seen and examined as a trans-local-ideal type, this entity 
has frequently been characterized as a monolithic and universal formation whose form, 
foundation, and impacts are remarkably similar across places (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; 
Peck, 2001).  
This governance seeks to “re-entrepreneurialize” cities physically and socially in 
advanced capitalist societies. Critical scholarship has conceptualized the neoliberal city as an 
entrepreneurial apparatus directing its energies to achieving economic success, attracting 
investment, and inducing job growth in competition with other cities. In this context, it is a city 
in which local bureaucracies are progressively transferred to non-state and quasi state bodies 
(Jessop, 1998; Peck and Tickell, 2007). Planning and growth decisions are increasingly driven by 
cost-benefit calculations rather than missions of service, equity, and social welfare (Brenner and 
Theodore, 2002; Leitner, Peck and Sheppard, 2007). Moreover, these governances now 
ostensibly offer an unparalleled harsh and punitive justification for their policies, programs, and 
growth trajectories (Smith, 1996; Keil, 2002). Residents are expected to behave responsibly, 
entrepreneurially, and prudently or face flagrantly punitive consequences. All these 
manifestations have been accompanied by critical social outcomes (e.g., deepening patterns of 
residential segregation, intensifying the informal balkanizing of populations, exacerbating 
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poverty in neglected neighborhoods), making neoliberal governance (its redevelopment 
programs) a crucial formation worthy of examination.   
This study is concerned with these neoliberal redevelopment governances. Of particular 
concern are the redevelopment governances in two large urban centers, Chicago and Buenos 
Aires. Chicago today is characterized by growing disparities between  prosperity and poverty 
which is manifest in swaths of gentrified housing and upscaled downtowns set in a broader 
reality of disinvested and struggling communities (Peck and Tickell, 2002; Wilson, 2006, 
Wacquant, 2008). In a similar fashion, Buenos Aires has experienced major increases in poverty, 
deprivation and segregation. For example, in 2006, the income gap between the richest 10% and 
the poorest 10% increased 17% compared to 1998 (Rodriguez et al., 2008). At the same time, 
dramatically upscaled and gentrified neighborhoods now flourish particularly in the south areas 
in Buenos Aires.  
Yet, neoliberal redevelopment governance has recently become a highly contested term 
in urban political economy. City officials and privileged real-estate and finance capital, faced 
with varying local conditions and challenges, adjust their redevelopment strategies accordingly 
in their pursuit of power, prestige, and capital accumulation. Specifically, neoliberal 
redevelopment governances, driven by the goal to resuscitate the city as a site for capital 
accumulation and competitiveness, must negotiate cultural norms, identity configurations (i.e., 
race, ethnicity, religion), normalized discursive practices, existing spatial structures (i.e., public 
housing), and varying degrees of resistance and political mobilization that altogether shape the 
differential trajectories and outcomes of redevelopment projects
1
. In short, redevelopment 
governances must remain adept to such varying local conditions to be able to unfold 
                                                             
1 In this context, the capitalist imperative to fill the “rent-gap” (Smith, 1996) merely represents one dimension – the 
economic – within a web of co-constitutive dimensions dialectically-fused within the process of neoliberal 
gentrification. 
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redevelopment projects successfully. People must also be mobilized and effective engagement 
strategies devised. Discourses have to activate people and implement strategies that can shape 
and change the actions of redevelopment governances (e.g. discourage the intention of 
developers to gentrify a neighborhood, compel more investment in poor communities, and/or 
induce the state to build or protect more affordable housing).  
Thus, many now suggest that neoliberal governance is too complex and variegated to be 
considered a singular, monolithic formation (Brenner et al., 2010; Keil, 2002; Leitner, Peck and 
Sheppard, 2007; McLeod, 2002; Mitchel, 2001; 2004; Peck and Tickell, 2007; Wilson and 
Wouters, 2003; Wilson, 2004, 2007). This group of scholars has especially argued that neoliberal 
redevelopment governance is constituted in the richness of distinctive localities and interacts in 
settings marked by distinctive political cultures and cultural milieus. In this context, my study 
works through the sense of a middle ground between these extremes. It is suggested that these 
formations are embedded in and constituted through conjunctural settings where the unique and 
generalizable meld in a dynamic fluidity to render all places significantly distinctive but also 
meaningfully generalizable. In other words, I chronicle, this governance is deeply 
geographically-historically specific even while there are key commonalities in their formation 
and operation (Keil, 2002; McLeod, 2002; Leitner, Peck and Sheppard, 2007; Wilson 2004).  
In this context, this work presents the operation of Buenos Aires and Chicago‘s neoliberal 
redevelopment governances according to four dimensions of study.  This study focuses on two 
main areas, La Boca and San Telmo in Buenos Aires and Pilsen in Chicago. In this work, I 
chronicle these settings as historically low-income/working class spaces that have recently begun 
to be  physically and socially transformed into profitable sites for real-estate and financial capital 
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investment. My study suggests that a surprisingly complex, contingent redevelopment 
governance now engages both areas.  
  This dissertation will contribute to our understanding of contemporary neoliberal 
redevelopment governances in several ways. Firstly, the intellectual merits of this project rest on 
a novel focus: the study of contingent urban neoliberalism. Current work on contemporary urban 
governance, to date, widely peripheralizes the centrality of contingency. To understand this 
emergent redevelopment governance, it is suggested, common sets of institutions, interests, 
programs, and motivations are seen to permeate and characterize these governances across the 
enormous diversity of places (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Gough, 2002; Hackworth, 2007; 
Peck, 2001; Wacquant, 2008). My study, in contrast, probes the nuances of these formations to 
reveal the intensity, magnitude and nature of these formations as contingent elements. In the 
process, I assess the contingency of these formations through the veracity of four central 
dimensions whose centrality as ‘contingent axes’ will be determined.  
Secondly, this research uses a cultural economy frame and conjunctural ontology that will 
allow me to produce a wealth of new insights about the dynamics of these governances. I will 
therefore chronicle the inseparability of local
2
-ness, historical specificity, and human agency, 
that poignantly embeds within the operation and effects of locally circulating structures.   
Thirdly, Chicago and Buenos Aires are barely explored case study sites in a burgeoning 
comparative perspective about this governance. Comparative research on the contingency of 
neoliberalism has addressed US and European cities to the neglect of Latin American cities.   
 
 
 
                                                             
2
 To note, I use the term “local” to reference a conjunctural ontology involving the interconnections of different 
spatial scales. Local, therefore, is seen to embody multi-scale processes that cannot be related to just a “local” scale 
of analysis.   
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Theoretical framework  
 
This research project will be grounded within an analytical framework centered upon a 
cultural economy perspective and a conjunctural ontology. In this context, the project will apply 
four dimensions to operationalize the sense of neoliberal contingency: (1) its historical and 
geographic specific constitution, (2) its complex cultural nature (3) its production and use of 
space (4) and its fluid and evolving character.  
Cultural economy, briefly stated, is an emergent perspective that sheds light on the likes of 
urban form, urban problems, and redevelopment governances by recognizing the inseparability 
of cultural and economic realms. Culture and economy are identified as being involved in a 
dialectical interplay; one ceaselessly makes the other in a continuous coalescing of forces that 
renders these spheres ontologically inseparable. Doing cultural economy, then, means acting on 
the assumption that economics do not merely operate in a cultural vacuum, but are performed 
and enacted through stocks of knowledge and discourses which infuse it with form, coherence, 
and legitimacy. In this study, a cultural economy perspective is key to critically examining the 
system of meanings and common understandings within discourses that neoliberal urban 
programs and institutions deploy to build normalcy, legitimacy and justify their operations (cf. 
Weber, 2002; Wilson et al., 2003). For example, before spaces and people can be accepted as 
objects for restructuring they must be constituted as something comprehensible, i.e., 
symbolically coded (e.g. vilified, stigmatized) through the use of common understandings which 
demarcate the likes of villains, victims, salvationists, and ominous forces.  
To posit a conjunctural ontology is to recognize the complexity of forces and processes that 
circulate through everyday life to build, animate, and direct the likes of redevelopment 
governances. Here, contingency and generalizability dynamically embed as humans always 
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construct these political governances through historical understandings, contemporary stocks of 
knowledge, and prevailing meaning systems in geographically specific settings and in distinctive 
historical moments. Here, the traditional distinction between agency and structure is collapsed to 
recognize the reality of inseparable and embedded forces fusing within each other. In this sense, 
urban governances are constructed within new economic and political imperatives but through 
grounded practices, understandings, and histories.  
In this context, I propose that neoliberal governance needs to be examined along four 
dimensions: they are constituted and reproduced as historically and geographically specific 
forms in local settings, they are complex cultural projects, they are enabled by production and 
use of space, and they are fluid, contested and evolving processes.  
 
Four dimensions of study  
 
 
First, this project suggests that these formations are embedded and constituted through a 
succession of grounded practices, i.e. situated political cultures, economic bases, social 
hierarchies, active resistances and institutional legacies. In other words, this governance is 
deeply geographically-historically specific in all cities whose daily activities and practices 
operate to constitute it. This project thus rejects the idea of this governance as external, pre-
formed, and prior to individual actions (Wright, 1989). Second, it is fruitful to see neoliberal 
redevelopment governance as complex cultural projects which continuously absorb and deploy 
common understandings of the world‘s processes, people and places to acquire legitimacy. 
Culture, in this sense, is to be critically interrogated as mobilized, used, and put in the service of 
neoliberal redevelopment governances. Thus, neoliberal redevelopment governances work to 
silence some cultural forms and encourage others. In order to put best cultural forms forward, 
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some have to be cultivated (for example, ‘aesthetic-livable communities’) and others eliminated 
(for example, ‘underclass culture’, ‘industrial aesthetics’, ‘black ghetto life’).  
Third, this formation can be seen to rely on making and using divergent kinds of space, 
i.e., both discursive and actual (material) spaces, to be operative apparatuses. Swynedouw (2000) 
and Peck and Tickell (2007) discuss space as the crucial medium and outcome of operation of 
neoliberal governance (i.e., a primordial essence scaled, coded with meanings, and physically 
structured in the service of neoliberal politics). In this sense, I focus on the production of 
absolute, material space that can directly assist the fostering of social relations and economic 
processes that directly enable the neoliberal project to unfold (e.g. gentrified neighborhoods, 
historical preservation programs, urban redevelopment projects, etc). But I also focus on the 
creating and mobilizing of discursive spaces. Such space, Doreen Massey's (1992) grounding 
medium in discourse, simultaneously frames, organizes, and illuminates ‘facts’ about people and 
processes (that is, resident identities and anti-neighborhood agents). This space is as important to 
constituting these identities as is any resource used in discourse
3
.  
Fourth, neoliberal redevelopment governances can be seen as complex, fluid, and forever 
evolving formations. Here, these formations continuously negotiate and adjust to shifting social, 
political and economic circumstances. Thus, its rhetoric and actions change and evolve in 
response to multiple things: changing political realities, actual contestation, morphing social 
times, and to new opportunities for redevelopment and development. For example, even in the 
height of ascendancy, much evidence chronicles that neoliberal operations are continually under 
                                                             
3 I engage Lefebvre and define this space as the crafted and codified (sometimes institutionalized) landscapes of the 
imagination which, with narrative, constitute ‘stocks of understanding’ via discourse (Liggett, 1995; McCann, 
2000). These spaces are thus seen as sets of narrated maps in discourse (for example, the ghetto; the ethnic enclave; 
the city; the global flows; the downtown) that function as visual rhetoric. Serving potentially diverse political 
projects, they illuminate absolute realities through which to know people and processes. They help make ‘facts’ 
about people and processes as representations of reality lodged in narrative.  
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forms of contestation that are always being negotiated and responded to (see Peck, Leitner, and 
Sheppard, 2007; Sheppard and Leitner, 2010). At the same time, neoliberal actors and operatives 
are forever mediating the vagaries of cultural and political conditions and landscapes as they 
realize that they must work through changing sensibilities. In this sense, this formation becomes 
more a process than a sedimented, determinative apparatus or a finalized project (Tickell and 
Peck, 2003).  
These key contours of the governances that I investigate are crucial in my study: they guide 
the investigation to unearth the magnitude and intensity of contingency that is associated with the 
current character of these formations.  
 
Methods and data  
 
This project focuses on the urban redevelopment policies and programs developed since 1989 
in Buenos Aires and Chicago. In the case of Chicago, the US federal government continued to 
cut long-standing redevelopment programs and their funding as the Daley II regime officially 
came into office.  Daley immediately rode the crest of neoliberal times to begin a redevelopment 
focus that would re-focus government to become more business oriented, operative in public-
private partnerships, and concentrative of resources to select “multiplier” spaces.  In the case of 
Buenos Aires,  the 1990s unfolding of structural adjustment policies across the country re-
sculpted the city redevelopment governance to be more business-astute, supportive of real-estate 
capital’s drive for gentrifying neighborhoods, and to temper its traditional role of ensuring equity 
in redevelopment dynamics.   
The selection of these case studies has been preferred over other global cities based on the 
following criteria: a) both Chicago and Buenos Aires are large and globally connected world 
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cities; b) they have been previously narrowly characterized as cities constructed by the same 
macroeconomic forces and impacted in the same manner; and c) this study will be the first one 
that chronicles neoliberal redevelopment governances in a comparative analysis of two cities 
with different cultural settings. In particular, this study will be focused on Pilsen-Chicago, and 
La Boca and San Telmo-Buenos Aires. Each neighborhood's assemblage of governance actors 
represents a neighborhood-specific manifestation of the broader, city-scale governance within 
which each of them is situated. Regarding Pilsen, I chose to do research in this site for three 
reasons: 1) redevelopment projects have progressively moved ahead after 1995 (although this has 
slowed down since 2008), 2) redevelopment projects have had a major impact on its social and 
physical landscape- to note, some studies have said that an estimated 5,000 residents in Pilsen 
have already been displaced  from their homes (Gamboa, 2001), 3) the area has a rich and 
controversial history of previous attempts to revitalize the area
4
. La Boca and San Telmo will be 
the focus of my study in Buenos Aires considered leading edges of consolidated redevelopment 
governance. To facilitate the purposes of this study, I will consider both neighborhoods as one 
geographic unit, popularly referred to “the south area”5. However, I will treat both 
neighborhoods separately only to describe specific urban policies that require more detailed 
analysis and attention. I selected this site for three main reasons: a) redevelopment projects have 
progressively moved ahead after 1998 experiencing a critical slowdown in 2001-2002; b) 
redevelopment projects have had a major impact on its social and physical landscape- to note, 
some studies have revealed that around 20 percent of the population had to move to the suburbs 
                                                             
4 Although this study is not examining racial gentrification, it could be argued that it is an interesting case to 
examine the recent new trends of racial gentrification unfolded compared to cases of white-led oriented 
gentrification (Lincoln Park, Bucktown, Wicker Park).   
5
 Although the south area has been officially limited by San Telmo, La Boca, Barracas, Nueva Pompeya, Villa 
Lugano, Villa Soldati, Bajo Flores and Mataderos neighborhoods (UEC, 2000), only San Telmo, La Boca and 
Barracas  are popularly associated with and mostly referenced to the south area (see Herzer, 2008); a historical and 
spatial legacy that dates from the European immigration. 
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in search for low rents and property taxes between late 1990s and early 2000 (Interview with 
Professor of Sociology, January 4, 2010); c) the growing  number of policies and programs 
implemented to revitalize the area compared to other areas in the city. 
Finally, the study acquires its data through the use of qualitative techniques: open-ended 
interviewing and appraising research reports, deconstructing technical documents, and 
deciphering newspaper articles. Open ended interviewing involved engagements with prominent 
actors: builders, developers, realtors, and community activists. This data was supplemented by 
conducting a content analysis of technical documents and newspapers that focused on local 
issues (Chicago Tribune, Chicago Sun-Times, Chicago Daily Defender, Chi-Town News, Clarín, 
La Nación and Página 12). I also deconstructed the content of a variety of blogs, online web 
sites, and public/private reports to examine the processural unfolding of these governances 
between 1989 and the present. Using this multiplicity of methods enabled a detailed, rich data set 
to be constructed. It also allowed for a rigorous cross-verification of findings to occur that 
enhanced the veracity of the data base. To ensure credible responses from interviewees, they 
were promised anonymity via the granting of pseudonyms in the paper if they preferred. 
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 Different approaches  
 
Neoliberalism, in one dominant definition of the term, references a mode of political 
thought that privileges a small government apparatus, the rights of individuals, and the prowess 
of private markets. In the process, it rejects the creation of a large, actively interventionist state 
and the idea that structures determine material realities in societies. This mode of thought is 
widely associated with the ideas of Friedrich Hayek (1944; 1960) and Milton Friedman (1984; 
1962). Following Hayek‘s principles of classical liberalism, Friedman provided an important 
update with his economic premise that the free market is a perfect scientific system. To 
Friedman,  individuals acting on their own self interest and desires optimize their own material 
standing and create  maximum benefits for all (1984;1962). Here, the greatest good would be 
encouraged by using government in very specific circumstances and only as a protector and 
arbitrator of free exchange (in Hackworth, 2007). The underpinning logic of these principles is 
that government is meddlesome, obtrusive, and throws off ‘natural’ supply-demand relationships 
to introduce inefficiency and bureaucracy in markets and across society. In “Capitalism and 
Freedom” (1962), Friedman proposes three economic tools to achieve a pure state of free-market 
popularly known as the ‘free-market trinity’:  privatization, deregulation and withdrawal of the 
state from many areas of social provision (e.g. health, education, housing). His anathema is the 
welfare state ―an entity that in many countries plays the primary role in protecting and 
promoting the economic and social well-being of its citizens. Here the state is deployed to 
promote equality of opportunity, equitable distribution of wealth, and public responsibility for 
those unable to avail themselves of the minimal provisions for a good life.   
In the 1980s, the ascendancy of neoliberalism led to it achieving a near-hegemonic status 
through the Thatcher and Reagan administrations. This era was marked by a dramatic cutting of 
14 
 
social programs, urban policies, and regulative ordinances in a diversity of spheres (the 
workplace, the operation of the economy) (Hackworth, 2007). By the 1990s, neoliberalism had 
become naturalized as the proper mode of governance in a variety of geo-institutional contexts; 
most profoundly, perhaps, in Latin American countries such as Chile, Argentina and Mexico that 
experienced sustained economic difficulties (Klein, 2007). There, the infamous Chicago Boys
6
, 
the global institutions IMF/World Bank, and bond rating agencies pushed to aggressively 
implement structural adjustment policies, following Friedmans’ holy trinity: privatization, 
deregulation, and cuts in social spending.  
Yet, this concept has been used to refer to a whole range of things, outcomes and 
processes. To Ward and England (2007:11-14), there are four ways to approach this concept. 
First neoliberalism is recognized as an ideological and hegemonic project. This understanding 
refers to the political (and cultural) dominance that is exercised through the formation of class-
based alliances-elite actors, institutions, and other representatives of capital at a variety of spatial 
scales, who produce and circulate a coherent program of ideas and images about the world, its 
problems, and how these are best solved (Keil, 2002; Peck, 2010). This is not to say that this 
view of the world is something imposed to the ‘subalterns’ but it is through the ‘willing consent’ 
that these core constructs permeates common sense. For example, the rise and acceptance of the 
entrepreneurial city, at the forefront of rendering this space tautly business-like and competitive,  
is the expectation of the citizen to behave entrepreneurially and to identify themselves as 
responsible for their own successes and failures (Ward and England, 2007).  
                                                             
6 During the1970s, these scholars were a group of young Chilean economists who were trained at the University of 
Chicago under Milton Friedman and Arnold Harberger. Later the training was extended to other Latin American 
countries such as Argentina and Uruguay. The training was the result of a "Chile Project" organized in the 1950s by 
the US State Department and funded by the Ford Foundation, which aimed at influencing Chilean economic 
thinking. The project was unsuccessful until the early 1970s.  
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Second, neoliberalism as policy and program, refers to the transferring of 
power/responsibilities/regulations from the public to the private sector, with the concomitant 
redefinition of these categories. The policies and programs that illustrate this understanding are 
the ones related to deregulation, privatization, decentralization and liberalization. Again, the 
underpinning logic of these policies is that government is inefficient to regulate the economy and 
society and therefore, all the responsibilities should be transferred to the market (Ward and 
England, 2007:11).  
Third, neoliberalism refers to a state form. This understanding references the quantitative 
and qualitative restructuring of nation-states, involving redrawing the boundaries between civil 
society, the market, and the state. Conceived this way, neoliberalism is the ‘rolling back’ 
(focused narrowly on market logics to accomplish the destruction of an entrenched welfare-state 
Keynesian) and the subsequent ‘roll out’ of new policies and institutions (from workfare 
programs and penal systems to partnership-based modes of urban governance and community 
regeneration). These facilitate something important: a more stable sociopolitical infrastructure 
for neoliberal strategies of capital accumulation (Peck and Tickell, 2002).   
Fourth, neoliberalism can be seen as a form of governmentality
7
. This understanding 
refers to the ways in which relations among and between peoples and things might be imagined, 
assembled, and translated, to effect political management at a distance (Larner, 2002). Both the 
economy and the state are involved in the construction of something essential to a society: 
                                                             
7 To Foucault (1991), governmentality is the way government is practiced that defines and characterizes the specific 
nature of the state as a governing institution- not the other way around. That is to say, there is nothing natural about 
in the state that enables it to govern or defines how it governs, but rather it is the ideas about, and the conditions and 
means of governing that determines the viability and success of the state and the institutional forms it may take. The 
success of the state or the art of government is dependent on how well ‘the right manner of disposing things’ and 
security are accomplished. The task of the state, then, is to achieve the maximum control, regulation and will 
consent of its population with minimum economic and political cost to itself. In general, governmentality can be 
understood as the establishment and exercise of political power, one in which the concept of government goes 
beyond the state’s management. It also involves the regulation of populations through multiple institutions and 
technologies in society.    
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autonomous, responsibilized ‘neo-liberal subjects’ (Rose, 1996). Through privatization and 
personalization, neoliberal governmentality aims at transforming recipients of welfare and social 
insurance into entrepreneurial subjects, who should be disciplined to become responsible for 
themselves. Such a project of transformation may be based either on a social work model of 
helping, training, and empowering, or on a police model of governing every aspect of life (Ward 
and England, 2007).  
On the urban front, urban neoliberalism has emerged across America and beyond. At the 
heart of this has been a kind of governance that has turned away from concerns about resource 
redistribution to concerns about resource attraction (Harvey, 1989, 2006). Here the bringing in of 
wealth, jobs, and investment is seen as of paramount concern. Set against this, who the recipients 
are of these resources has increasingly been peripheralized as central policy. Thus, the domain of 
distribution has increasingly been supplanted by the domain of “growth” and resource attraction. 
In addition, urban neoliberalism has taken to explaining urban problems and urban possibilities 
through the lens of the autonomous and responsible subject. Persistent dilemma of the U.S. city, 
for example – crime, blight, poverty, unemployment, under-employment - has increasingly been 
cast as individual failures rather than societal structural outcomes. In this context, residents are 
expected to behave responsibly, entrepreneurially and prudently. They are said to be responsible 
for their own successes and failures.  
 
Neoliberalism as a contingent construct  
 
Urban neoliberal governance has been now widely centered as an analytical object in 
Anglo urban studies and urban geography. Initially, studies of this object have assumed a 
spatially invariant entity with common features that span the wealth of different cities in places 
like America. So, such governances in cities like Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Boston, and 
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Baltimore have been posited as sufficiently similar in their membership, goals, values, use of 
discourse, and policy tools used. This has facilitated the drive to uncover countrywide facets and 
attributes of this entity.  
Recently, this assumption has been challenged. In particular, researchers have 
increasingly recognized the possibility that these governances could be distinctively different and 
distinctive across places. In this setting, defining neoliberal redevelopment governance and its 
influences has become a highly contested term within critical urban geography. Many now 
suggest that neoliberalism is too complex and variegated to be considered a singular, monolithic 
formation, or that its implementation is so locally contingent that we cannot plausibly speak of 
one ideal-type placeless neoliberalism (Mitchell, 2001; Keil, 2002; McLeod, 2002; Wilson, 
2004, 2007). The last group of scholars has argued that we need to recognize that neoliberalism 
is constituted in the richness of distinctive localities. That is, the economic structure, political 
culture and history of a place determine to a large extent the specific forms that neoliberalism 
takes “on the ground” (Mitchell, 2001; Keil, 2002; McLeod, 2002; Wilson, 2004, 2007). In 
addition, these recent studies contend, acts of contestation and resistance continually negotiate 
the boundary between neoliberal instrumental rationality and the normativity of everyday life.  
The pressures of neoliberal operations are very real, but it does not follow that it is immune to 
the influences of contestation (Leitner, 2007). In short, neoliberal redevelopment governances 
(institutions, programs and policies) find it necessary to maintain certain state provisions and 
acknowledge human rights. As such, these scholars argue that it is incomplete and misleading to 
frame the imposition of neoliberalism as a completely top-down project. At the national scale, 
we can have cities caught up in the same economic circumstances and desires to restructure. But 
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in the world of evolving places, “we see a patchwork of wildly varying neoliberal governances 
that often barely resemble each other” (Wilson, 2004: 772).  
The reasons for an emphasis on contingency are as varied as the intellectual strategies 
used to make these arguments. One main reason is rooted in a concern about the construction of 
language in relation to its empirical referent. Many are concerned that ideal-type neoliberalism 
elides the discursively constructed nature of the ideology (Hackworth and Moriah, 2006). Others 
are concerned politically with the discursive portrayal of a concept that is monolithic, 
omnipresent and largely impossible to contest (Gibson-Graham, 2006). According to Hackworth 
and Moriah (2006) another reason is rooted in the fact that much of the literature on contingent 
neoliberalism is derived from the discipline of geography, which has long been characterized by 
a tension between the search for nomothetic spatial laws and the recognition of idiographic 
places.  
Yet, in my reading of this recent literature, much of the work on contingency lacks 
precision and specificity. These works do not offer nuanced appraisals of what processes and 
forces drive this contingency. Contrarily, the work of Wilson (2004) does provide four main 
different dimensions that define the general parameters of this contingency. In addition, the work 
of Wilson and Sternberg (2012) has recently focused on the processural character of neoliberal 
governance, chronicling the manifestation of a shifting rhetoric circa-2005 within Chicago‘s 
redevelopment governance in both the Bronzeville and Pilsen neighborhoods. Yet, comparative 
analysis across cities remains speculative since these attempts are only superficially informed by 
empirical work. In this context, this research plans to deepen the interrogation of neoliberal 
contingency and the explanations for this.  
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Central to my endeavor is to highlight the importance of and use of comparative, 
empirically informed analysis.  Without a rigorous, empirically-based anchor plugged into 
comparative analysis, the understanding of this flourishing governance in all of its possible, rich 
contingencies will remain speculative and incomplete. I, thus, take up this focus in this study by 
interrogating the contingency of neoliberal redevelopment governance in two cities, Chicago and 
Buenos Aires. 
 Finally, the definitional issue. To operationalize this research, I use the term “neoliberal 
redevelopment governance” to get at the physical and social transformation of urban space in my 
two case study cities. I identify this as a central subset of neoliberal governance – it is its central 
manifestation in the land and property restructuring realm—that carries the “neoliberal project” 
to this particular domain. For this study, I define neoliberal redevelopment governance as the 
policies, programs and procedures, and assemblage of institutions (builders, developers, financial 
institutions, the local state and auxiliary institutions including, media, universities, chambers of 
commerce) that unify around a common vision of city redevelopment and push to make this a 
reality. Such institutions work collectively to create planning agendas, bolster such plans through 
the creation and usage of discursive formations, and implement redevelopment projects through 
tools and policies. Thus, neoliberal redevelopment governance is more than simply producing 
and rationalizing new policies and procedures; it also means working through knowledge, 
visions of the city, its people, and its processes whose origins lie in humanly created stocks of 
human sensibilities (Wilson, 2007). I also support the notion that this governance is fluid and 
processed-based, i.e., it evolves in response to changing political realities, contestation and 
obstacles for development and redevelopment.   
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Neoliberal governance ascendancy  
 
In the 1960s and continuing into the early 1970s, federal redevelopment policies in the U.S. 
sought to upgrade blighted neighborhoods and reverse decaying inner cities. A plethora of 
programs – urban renewal, the community development block grant program, historic 
preservation, urban homesteading – were the major initiatives (Hirsh, 1983). However, by the 
1970s, this federal model of redevelopment had inaugurated some degree of reinvestment but 
also, ironically, exacerbated disinvestment, decay, and racial tensions across vast city spaces 
(Gotham, 2001). During the mid to late 1960s, the riots in Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Kansas 
City, and Los Angeles became illustrative of a decade of massive displacement of people and 
neighborhoods due to these programs, particularly urban renewal and its clearance of “slums” 
(Gotham, 2001: 10). This policy was criticized by liberals -- who blasted urban renewal for 
destroying neighborhoods – and by conservatives --that castigated this as an exemplar of “big 
government”.  
David Bartelt (1993) identifies two faulty assumptions embedded within the urban renewal 
program concerning the causes and consequences of urban disinvestment. First, the program 
assumed that private capital would flow into renewal areas once officials had cleared blighted 
structures, relocated previous occupants, and rebuilt infrastructure. However, what usually 
happened was that large-scale clearance produced vacant lots and abandoned dwellings (Gotham, 
2000; Sanders, 1980; Weiss, 1980). Second, urban renewal policies assumed that residents 
within affected areas would support large-scale clearance of their impoverished neighborhoods 
as evidence of improvement and progressive change. In fact, many affected residents opposed 
urban renewal efforts because of their destabilizing and segregative consequences (Bennett, 
1986; Hartman, 1966). Other authors also note that urban renewal  gained increased opposition 
because local officials often designated tax subsidies and other federal resources for the 
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expansion of universities, hospitals, large corporations, and other elite institutions that tended to 
employ middle-and upper income residents rather than lower-income inner city residents 
(Bartelt, 1993; Kleniewski, 1984; Squires, 1991).  
In 1974 the federal government decided to discontinue the urban renewal program. Instead, a 
period of shrinking federal resources, devolution of policy implementation to state governments, 
and increased reliance on neoliberal policies increasingly became the core features of federal 
urban policy (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1986; Gotham and Wright, 2000). America’s federal 
government was fundamentally restructured in the early 1970s. Maintaining collective 
consumption levels -the basis of Keynesian economic regulation- was supplanted by the pursuit 
of unregulated economic growth. The American inner city became increasingly removed from 
the economic mainstream with an enormous concentration of the working and the workless poor 
(Wilson, 1987). Direct expenditures to localities were cut during the 1980s supported by the 
neoliberal rhetoric of returning power to the local. Cities like Chicago, Cleveland, and 
Indianapolis became more entrepreneurial in part to cover the budgetary shortfalls that 
accompanied this transition (Harvey 1989; Leitner 1990).   
In short, since the 1970s, U.S. cities have developed new strategies and tools for 
engineering urban redevelopment in response to broad economic changes and shifts in the nature 
of federal intervention. As an example of these tools: The federal government replaced the urban 
renewal program with the Community Development Block Grant Program (CDBG) that gave 
cities more control and discretion over the use of federal funds. With the new CDBG program, 
the amount of money assured solely for urban renewal areas was now competing with demands 
for federal assistance from all areas of the city. In this way, cities could use federal money to 
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revitalize moderately deteriorating areas, little money would be spent in the most deteriorated 
areas, or in healthy areas that could survive without federal assistance.  
Other federal initiatives for subsidies to private development were implemented such as the 
1977 Housing and Urban Development Act, which created the Urban Development Action Grant 
(UDAG) program to dispense funds to local governments to encourage private investment in 
economically depressed areas. Neoliberal initiatives such as enterprise zones and empowerment 
zones have accompanied the proliferation of new forms of local tax subsidies such as tax 
abatements, industrial revenue bonds, business improvement districts (BIDS)
8
, tax increment 
financing (TIF)
9
, and the rise of community development corporations (CDCs)
10
 (Gittel and 
Wilder, 1999; Gotham, 1998; Gotham and Wright, 2000; Harrison and Bluestone, 1988; Marcuse 
1993; Squires, 1991, 1989).   
These new strategies and policy tools reflected a wholesale shift in the priorities of local 
governments, which increasingly became less concerned with issues of social redistribution and 
provision of public services in favor of promoting economic competitiveness, attracting 
investment capital, and creating a favorable business climate (Leitner, 1990). The results of these 
measures have been especially profound in Chicago: gentrification has proceeded ahead, as we 
will later see.  
                                                             
8
 A business improvement district (BID) is a defined area within which businesses pay an additional tax or fee in 
order to fund improvements within the district's boundaries. Grant funds acquired by the city for special programs 
and/or incentives such as tax abatements can be made available to assist businesses or to recruit new business. 
9 Tax Increment Financing (TIF) is a development tool. The city declares an area “blighted” and unlikely to  
be developed without the diversion of tax revenues. At the moment a municipality creates a TIF district, the sum of 
all the properties and the property taxes they represent within the district is tallied up and frozen. As economic 
development increases within the district, any new property taxes generated above the frozen rate are kept in a 
special account not subject to normal municipal budgetary appropriations or claims by other taxing bodies to support 
development. TIFs pay for everything from infrastructure to direct grants to developers.    
10
 The CDC is a broad term referring to Community development corporations are non-profit, community-based 
organizations that anchor capital locally through the development of both residential and commercial property, 
ranging from affordable housing to developing shopping centers and even owning businesses. First formed in the 
1960s, they have expanded rapidly in size and numbers since.  
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In Chicago, the focus of this study, this “neoliberalizing shift” was paralleled by an 
undercurrent that was to further socio-spatially polarize the city: deepened deindustrialization 
and service sector growth. Like other Midwestern cities, Chicago’s economy underwent 
significant changes after 1975 that were intensified by the internationalization of the economy 
(i.e. the integration of national economies into the global economy through trade, foreign direct 
investment, capital flows, migration, and the spread of technology). In the initial stage of the de –
industrialization, manufacturing relocation to suburban areas was a key marker (Demissie, 2006). 
In Chicago, city-wide manufacturing employment between 1958 and 1972 increased from 
329,000 to 389,000. However, from 1972 to 2000, manufacturing employment plunged by nearly 
267,000 jobs (Department of City Planning, 1958; US Department of Labor, in Demissie 2006). 
As described in Koval (2006), two economics evolved in Chicago:  low-wage unskilled jobs and 
high-wage white-collar jobs. This polarized market collectively comprises more than 55 percent 
of the approximately 55,000 new jobs created per year in Chicago between 1990 and 2005 (see 
Koval 2006; Bennet et al., 2006).  
By 2000, Chicago had amassed the largest concentration of high-tech workers in any U.S. 
city, and the second largest number of low-wage unskilled workers (Moberg, 2006; Koval et al., 
2006). Moreover, as a greater proportion of jobs became low-wage service sector, propelled by 
the ascendant service economy, increased poverty was anything but surprising; the share of 
workers earning less than $7.00 per hour doubled between 1983 and 2004, from 2.7 to 5.4 
percent (in Wilson and Sternberg, 2012).  
The restructuring of manufacturing and the suburbanization of jobs have had a profound 
impact on the geography of local employment, producing devastating effects in Chicago and its 
neighborhoods (Demissie, 2006). Remarkably devastating in the South Side and West Side, 
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economic restructuring, deindustrialization, and the shifting geography of employment have 
especially undermined working-class African American and Latino neighborhoods. These 
neighborhoods have been further marginalized by punitive public policies, most conspicuously in 
the housing sphere (Demissie, 2006). In terms of public housing, the aggressive scaling down 
and transformation of the city‘s public housing has been nothing short of dramatic. Thus, 
Chicago in 1999 inaugurated its Plan for Transformation, offered by the Chicago Housing 
Authority in conjunction with the federal government. It unleashed a massive demolition of high-
rise public projects across the city. In the program, more than 80,000 Chicago residents (mainly 
on the South and West Sides) were at least temporarily displaced to new homes (Bennett et al., 
2006).  In Bronzeville, the South Side’s area of greatest public housing concentration, the 
demolition of Stateway Gardens, Robert Taylor Homes, Dearborn Homes, Ickes Homes, and 
Madden Park-Wells-Darrow Homes (between 2002 and 2006) cleared more than 140 acres of 
land, half of which was targeted for private-sector redevelopment (Wilson et al. 2004). 
By 2005, Chicago’s socio-spatial fragmenting had become exacerbated. This would 
accelerate shortly thereafter with the onset of the Great Recession. Thus, with the burst of the 
housing bubble in 2008, a ripple effect reverberated across most other sectors of the local 
economy (Wylie, 2011). Growing mortgage foreclosures, blocks of shuttered homes on the south 
and west sides, and a shockingly moribund real-estate sector shot through the local economy, 
pummeling businesses, industries, and the local tax base that eviscerated local economic 
conditions. Foreclosures here were seven times the national average of 1.2 percent (Hughes, 
2007). In this context, the streets of Chicago increasingly reflected a series of economic 
hardships: growing homelessness, increased unemployment and underemployment, and a 
dramatically lessened number of facilities to engage young people after school, during summers, 
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and when unemployed (Wilson, 2006). Moreover, social service agencies that once relied on 
public funds had severely contracted or disappeared as well as public housing funding 
opportunities (Wilson, 2006). New funding priorities have meant block grant cutbacks for 
housing and social projects of more than 25 percent in the last six years (Wilson, 2006). Only a 
few minutes from downtown, it seemed too many, these neighborhoods reflected a different 
reality. 
  
Chicago’s neoliberal redevelopment governance  
 
Chicago‘s era of neoliberal redevelopment governance began with the rise of Richard 
Daley as mayor in 1989. From the outset, Daley and his alliance of institutions have sought to 
promote Chicago as a global city. This alliance has focused on physically and aesthetically 
upgrading the Loop and its adjoining neighborhoods. The goal has been to beautify downtown 
parks, streets, and plazas, promote gentrification, and build an international, glittery downtown.  
This ongoing neoliberal redevelopment governance has relied on two main institutions:  
local government and a public-private civic group, the Commercial Club of Chicago (CCC)
11
.  
Both have mobilized other institutions -- builders, developers, realtors, and auxiliary players (the 
                                                             
11 This organization was founded in 1877 in order to “advance the public welfare and the commercial interests of 
metropolitan Chicago by co-operative effort, social intercourse, and a free interchange of views (…) [The 
membership] is limited to residents of the Chicago metropolitan area who shall be deemed qualified by reason of 
their personality, general reputation, position in their business or profession, and service in the public welfare” 
(Chicago Metropolis 2020, execute summary, Jan 1999). The most prominent business and corporate leaders are 
part of this organization: Chicago Urban League, Chicago Community Trust, Energy Foundation, John D. and 
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, McCormick Tribune Foundation, Sara Lee Corp., Elizabeth Morse Genius 
Charitable Trust, LaSalle Bank, McDonald‘s, Motorola, Pricewaterhouse Coopers, Sears, etc (Chicago Metropolis 
2020, execute summary, Jan 1999). Among the many other organizations who are devoted to various aspects of the 
region‘s economic, environmental, and social well-being are: Business and Professional People for the Public 
Interest; the Center for Neighborhood Technology; Chicago United, Inc.; the Civic Federation; the Leadership 
Council for Metropolitan Open Communities; the Local Initiatives Support Corporation; and the Environmental Law 
and Policy Center. In addition, the CCC has benefited from consultation with many universities in the region: 
DePaul University, Northwestern University, Roosevelt University, the University of Chicago, and the University of 
Illinois at Chicago (Chicago Metropolis 2020, execute summary, Jan 1999). 
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media, utility companies, universities, Chambers of Commerce) – to deepen and embolden the 
governance (see table 1). 
 
TABLE 1: NEOLIBERAL REDEVELOPMENT GOVERNANCE IN CHICAGO 
Population Size  2,695,598 (Census 2010) 
Institutional Composition Local government 
CCC (Commercial Club of Chicago): Prominent 
planners, builders, developers, realtors 
Auxiliary players: media, utility companies, 
universities, Chambers of Commerce  
Dominant Rhetoric Used  Globally competitive and going global city:  
“Mold Chicago into one of the great cities of the 
world” (Commercial Club of Chicago, 2000) 
 
This amalgam has used a number of tools to facilitate its restructuring.  First, tax 
increment financing, a tool first used by Mayor Jane Byrne in the downtown in 1981, has been 
used across the city. This tool designates TIF Districts whereupon extra tax dollars are imposed 
on properties with the funds plowed back to be used in these districts.  Often, in residential 
districts, funds are funneled into these areas to drive gentrification (Koval, et al., 2006). TIFs 
have been strategically deployed: they have helped gentrify and upscale strategic Chicago 
locations, notably South Loop-Bronzeville, the Central Loop, South Campus-Pilsen, and the 
28 
 
East-West “Wicker Park” gentrification corridor (Wilson, 2004). By 2009, more than 150 tax 
increment financing districts dotted Chicago, making the city the largest user of this tool in the 
world. Moreover, the governance expediently invented the Plan for Transformation in 1999 to 
destroy public housing and to re-use this land for redevelopment. This public housing, clustering 
on Chicago’s South and West sides, has for decades been located in “off-the-governance” radar 
zones. Located in classic “ghettos” and “slums,” prominent redevelopment visions peripheralized 
these locations for redevelopment. However, with encroaching gentrification and large swaths of 
devalued land creating a “rent-gap” that would make redevelopment profitable, these areas 
suddenly appeared on the governance radar. As a result, this Plan was formulated to free-up this 
devalued land for potential restructuring which would be rooted in tearing down public housing 
and re-selling the land to private sector developers. But the rhetoric deployed by this governance 
has been equally important to be successful in its projects, programs and practices. Previous 
mayoral regimes (Jane Byrne, Harold Washington, David Orr, and Eugene Sawyer) lacked the 
coherent and unified vision and ideology that this new governance in Chicago has cultivated (in 
Wilson and Sternberg, 2012). These regimes strived to incorporate the frequently incompatible 
demands of the industrial sectors, neighborhood organizations, and blue-collar workers that 
ultimately conditioned an unstable, vacillating vision of development (in Wison and Sternberg, 
2012). But the national and hegemonic rise of a neoliberal ethos across America was to change 
this.  
Daley’s rise to power enabled this governance to increasingly work through and circulate 
the ethos and practices of neoliberalism: the need to entrepreneurialize government actions, 
create more responsible and business oriented citizens, build a strong local business climate, and 
fashion a globally competitive, consumption-oriented city (Bennett, 2006; Hammel, 2006). To 
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make this a reality, gentrification has emerged as a central policy instrument for the city’s and 
region’s political economy. Two forces have driven this process: growing concern about 
Chicago’s place in the emergent global economy and the general acceptance of the ascendant 
neoliberal sensibilities that increasingly captured the American consciousness (Wilson, 2006). In 
this context, as an urban policy, gentrification fit the neoliberal scheme perfectly: it is a process 
that directly rejects the use of government subsidies or resources, it is a private market process, 
and it “culturalizes” the city via remaking of new neighborhoods, public spaces. In the process, 
gentrification has been increasingly offered as “something efficient, progressive, and unleashing 
of supposedly free and rational actors” (Wilson, 2006: 191). It has been lavishly extolled by the 
redevelopment governance as something to heal struggling neighborhoods, productive of a 
positive city culture, and increasingly generating of revenues for the city. All, it has been said, 
helps to build a world-class downtown and a world-class city (see Wilson 2004 and Wison and 
Sternberg, 2012). As the Commercial Club proclaimed, the objective for Chicago is to: “mold 
Chicago into one of the great cities of the world” (website, p. 2). For this, the CCC created an 
organization, The Chicago Metropolis 2020 that envisioned Chicago as the competitive 
American city of the century (Chicago Metropolis 2020, 1999). One of the principal objectives 
of this organization was advancing the upscaling of Chicago‘s Loop and beyond. As the 
following quote reflects, the Chicago Metropolis 2020 Plan is significant in the number of 
structural issues that it addresses, but also, it reflects the central role that certain organizations 
and institutions are to play in defining and managing the city’s unfolding redevelopment.  
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Metropolis 2020 will bring the resources and participation 
of the business community together with other outstanding 
regional civic organizations and governmental leaders that have 
both the expertise and commitment to help promote and implement 
the goals of the plan. It will convene these organizations and their 
leaders and seek to unite them in a common mission to enhance the 
region’s position as one of the world’s foremost economic centers 
and as a place known worldwide for the quality of life and equity 
of opportunity that its residents enjoy (Chicago Metropolis 2020, 
executive summary, January 1999).  
 
In the chapter that follows, I examine the evolving redevelopment governance in Pilsen, 
focusing on its main redevelopment projects and narratives that have articulated, guided, and 
built common knowledge and understandings for redevelopment projects to move forward
12
.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
12 Although this study is not examining racialized gentrification, it could be argued that it is an interesting case to 
examine the recent new trends of racialized gentrification (e.g. in Bronzeville and Pilsen) unfolded compared to 
cases of white-led oriented gentrification (Lincoln Park, Bucktown, Wicker Park).  
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 Neoliberal redevelopment governance in Pilsen   
 
 
Pilsen, also known to its residents as “La 18” and to planners as Chicago’s “Lower West 
Side,” is located just southwest of Chicago’s central business district in close proximity to many 
of the city’s main middle-class attractions. The community is demarcated by Western Avenue to 
the west, 16
th
 Street to the north, and the South Branch of the Chicago River to the east and south 
(figures 1 and 2). 
Originally built for recently immigrated, working class households and families from Eastern 
Europe, Pilsen has been home to various ethnic groups. In the 1920s, Pilsen was home to 85,700 
immigrants primarily from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Lithuania, and Italy who gave the 
community a distinctively bohemian feel (Oclander, 1998). Immigrants were attracted to Pilsen 
by the access to nearby local entry-level factory and service jobs. These jobs were found in the 
downtown area, the South Loop rail yards, and the industrial corridor to the east bordering the 
south branch of the Chicago River (Oclander, 1998). Pilsen survived the Great Chicago Fire of 
1871 and continued as a working class neighborhood, although much of the city’s industry had 
moved westward as a result of the fire (Chicago Fact Book Consortium, 1995).  
Beginning in the 1950s, the demographics shifted to reflect an expanding Latino 
population, predominantly from Mexico. A massive wave of Latinos fled to Pilsen, displaced by 
urban renewal and the construction of the University of Illinois (Oclander, 1998: 10). They were 
attracted to Pilsen because the community was nearby, had significantly inexpensive housing, 
and was close to the many factories that employed them. The dominant employer, U.S. Steel's 
Southworks Steel Mill, employed 18,000 at its peak in the 1960s (Bensman and Lynch, 1990). 
By 1970, Pilsen became the first majority Latino community in Chicago (Chicago Fact Book 
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Consortium, 1995). Many came to work in the city's stockyards, meat-packing plants, steel mills, 
and fabricated-metal plants (Grammenos, 2006). The community became an important port of 
entry for Latino immigrants and one of Chicago‘s largest Latino communities. According to the 
U.S. Census, Pilsen in 2010 was 88.9% Hispanic with 49.1% of the population foreign-born 
(U.S. Census, 2010). Together with two adjacent communities, Heart of Chicago and Little 
Village, it served as a center for Chicago‘s “flourishing Mexican community” and, as an 
amalgam, became the dominant port of entry in Chicago for Spanish-speaking families 
(Grammenos, 2006). Yet, for newcomers, the port of entry for Spanish speakers has moved to 
the suburbs, predominantly Cicero and Berwyn, as immigrants pursue jobs and lower rents 
(Interview with reporter from the Chicago Tribune, November 30, 2009). In the housing sphere, 
Pilsen registers 13,948 housing units, 68 percent are rental and the remaining 32 percent are 
home-owned units. In 2010, median household income was $36,154 (LISC/Metroedge, 2010), 
which was 28 percent less than the 2009-2010 median household income for the entire city 
($46,350), (U.S. Census, 2010, adjusted for inflation). 
In the last 10 years, the city’s redevelopment governance has aggressively strived to 
facilitate a restructuring of Pilsen. Its proximity to downtown, relatively low land values, and 
sturdy stock of housing has made the area, in their eyes, an ideal place to expand the city 
gentrification project. The impetus for change came in the form of university expansion. The 
University of Illinois Chicago campus, adjoining Pilsen on the north, had been a cramped, 
congested campus without many of the amenities that university campuses seek to provide (a 
retail center, expansive dorm buildings, and graduate students housing facilities). The University, 
mobilizing the aforementioned institutions, decided upon a massive areal restructuring – the 
South Campus project—that would dramatically transform the fabric of the area. This became 
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one of the three major restructuring projects in the vicinity that would have a major effect on 
transforming Pilsen; its specifics are described shortly. As discussed, promoting gentrification 
has been at the core of Chicago’s neoliberal redevelopment governance’s priorities and agendas. 
Pilsen, like every neighborhood in Chicago, has come to be eyed for its possibilities to gentrify. 
Such developments, the governance suggests, play a role in helping Chicago polish up its 
culture, refine it aesthetics, and help the city go global.    
In this context, gentrification has recently emerged on Pilsen’s eastern flank, along 
Halsted Street. However, this endeavor was not new: Previous attempts to revitalize the area 
occurred in 1973. The Chicago 21 Plan aimed to transform working class communities 
surrounding the CBD into middle class areas for downtown workers (Lutton, 1998). This plan 
proposed a comprehensive and extensive restructuring of Chicago‘s disinvested, inner-ring 
neighborhoods bordering the Loop (Rast, 1999). This included the demolition of large swaths of 
Pilsen‘s low-income housing stock (Bentacur, 2005). However, it was not until late 1995 that 
Pilsen faced the pressures of gentrification and residential displacement.
13
An assemblage of 
institutions were at the forefront of this push (see table 1):  the city directly through Alderman 
Danny Solis, the University of Illinois Campus Consortium; Podmajersky Development 
Company, Kimball Hill-Mota Construction Company, Lipe Properties Company; and The 
Revitalization Project (Puente, 1998). Pilsen’s close location to the loop, affordable housing, and 
prevalence of low value of land and rent have proved strong incentives for governance actors to 
start expanding the gentrification frontier (Smith, 1996).  
                                                             
13 Urban planner Peter Marcuse (1999: 790-1) defines gentrification as, “the movement into a previously working-
class area by upper-income households, generally professionals, managers, technicians, the new gentry, resulting in 
the displacement of the former lower-income residents.” This definition recognizes the class-based nature of the 
process as well as the centrality of displacement to the experience of gentrification. It is the displacement of 
population and assumed deterioration of neighborhoods that make gentrification a contested process. See a detailed 
discussion about gentrification in Loretta Lees (2005) and Hague and Curran (2008).   
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 TABLE 2: NEOLIBERAL REDEVELOPMENT GOVERNANCE IN PILSEN 
Institutional composition Local government: Alderman Danny Solis 
Commercial Club of Chicago: Prominent planners, builders, 
and developers (Podmajersky, Inc.; Lipe properties; The 
Revitalization Project-LISC) 
Auxiliary players: Media (Chicago Tribune, Chicago Sun 
Times), universities (University of Illinois at Chicago), 
chambers of commerce (Pilsen Together Chamber of 
Commerce) 
Dominant rhetoric used  Pilsen needs to become a vibrant neighborhood to serve the 
purposes of the city’s entrepreneur and competitive ethos 
 
After 1995, the gentrification drive accelerated in Pilsen. In a sustained and systematic 
process, builders, developers, and the city worked through general motivations, perceptions, and 
sensibilities of the Pilsen community to rationalize and normalize the virtues and benefits of their 
projects. In this sense, these actors have strived to meet their goals by working through people’s 
needs and fears about what Pilsen is and what Pilsen needs to be. This amalgam of organizations, 
in other words, tapped understandings and sensibilities to make the case for development.  
It is worth mentioning that this gentrifying of the community has been beset by 
controversy and contentiousness. Pilsen is also home to many Latino organizations and has had a 
history of ongoing activism led by long term organizations such as The Revitalization Project (a 
fluid and evolving organization that is now aligned with the city, the Pilsen Together Chamber of 
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Commerce, and the LISC/Chicago foundation
14
), Pilsen Neighbors Community Council (also 
aligned with the city), and Pilsen Alliance. Years of activism have notably helped improve public 
schools, find jobs for residents, and train local youth (Puente, 1996). But this political activism 
has also been fueled by attempts to gentrify the community and fear of displacement. Residents 
and institutions mobilized to struggle against the Chicago 21 Plan in 1973 and Chicago 1992 
World's Fair (see Encyclopedia of Chicago, 2010; Puente, 1996). Both plans aimed to transform 
working class communities surrounding the CBD into middle class areas for downtown workers 
(Lutton, 1998). These plans proposed a comprehensive and extensive restructuring of Chicago‘s 
disinvested, inner-ring neighborhoods bordering the Loop (Rast, 1999). This included the 
demolition of large swaths of Pilsen‘s low-income housing stock (Bentacur, 2005). This struggle 
to preserve the neighborhood from gentrifying continued in the late 1980s and in the period 
under study; 1995 to 2011.  
The following section examines the most significant redevelopment initiatives (offered 
by an ever-evolving redevelopment governance) that since 1995 have changed the physical and 
social character of Pilsen. Neoliberal redevelopment governance’s crafted rhetoric, freely using 
metaphors, imagined spaces, and sanitary codings will be discussed in my analysis. These 
discursive elements have been important to this redevelopment initiative: They have helped 
rationalize the supposed virtues and benefits of the development projects to the general public 
(see table 2). Finally, each of the projects will be examined in terms of the contestations and 
impacts that followed from their being offered.  
   
 
                                                             
14 A prominent foundation that is supported by MacArthur Foundation- which is part of the CCC-, Lloyd A. Fry 
Foundation, and Annie E. Casey Foundation among other institutions.  
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Principal redevelopment initiatives in Pilsen   
 
Pilsen Industrial TIF and the Centro 18 Condominium Project   
The industrial TIF,
15
 created in 1998, constituted one of the prominent incentives for 
advancing redevelopment in Pilsen. At the same time, it became one of the most vividly 
remembered events by Pilsen grassroot organizations: “with the TIF the change in Pilsen begins” 
(Interview with representative of Pilsen Alliance, March 25, 2010).  
This TIF designation was an outgrowth of a decimating city and community trend. Pilsen, 
a substantially working class population, relied on local factories as a source for employment 
(Baker, 1995). But since 1970, deindustrialization hit Pilsen hard, leaving 300 factories and 
warehouses in various states of disrepair and abandonment (Baker, 1995). In response, the city, 
prominent developers, and builders pushed to enact this tax increment financing district. The 
“Pilsen Industrial Corridor Redevelopment Project Area TIF District” was created in early June, 
1998. At least initially, the goal was to protect existing industry and to encourage job growth 
from the attraction of other industries. In support of this, the city announced that the TIF would 
encourage “…a wide range of land uses, including manufacturing, distribution, assembly, 
warehousing and research and development uses” (City of Chicago, 1998: 19). Yet, the goal of 
this TIF would change over time as redevelopment of the area continued and opened up 
possibilities for a more affluent (and lucrative) transformation. 
Under Illinois State Law, TIF districts are designated as either in “blighted” or 
“conservation areas” and are to encourage economic development that supposedly would not 
                                                             
15 There are now 153 TIFs in Chicago, which together cover approximately 16% of the city’s tax base (Becker, in 
Hague 2005). A report from Chicago Reader notes that “eight of the ten districts set to receive the most TIF-funded 
investment through 2011 are in prosperous neighborhoods near downtown, such as the South Loop and West Loop, 
while the districts that will receive the least investment are concentrated on the south and west sides” (Joravsky and 
Dumke, 2009). To note, the impacts of this rapid allocation of land into TIF districts, together with the diversion of 
property tax revenues from Chicago’s general fund into area-specific projects, have provoked much local media 
commentary (see Joravsky 2004). 
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happen without the TIF designation (Pilsen Industrial Corridor TIF District, 2008). The TIF 
initially proposed the widening of streets and repair of sidewalks in a 907-acre zone between 
Cermak Road and the Chicago River where some 300 floundering factories and warehouses 
existed (Figure2). The TIF district was also intended to upgrade aged commercial strips along 
18th Street and Ashland and Blue Island Avenues (Chicago Tribune, February 11, 1998). 
 
 Figure 1: Pilsen (Lower West Side)  
 
Source:  Chicago 77 (www.thechicago77.com/wp-content/uploads/2008), (retrieved August 2009) 
 
 
   PILSEN 
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Figure 2: Pilsen neighborhood   
Source: m.wikitravel.org (retrieved June 2010) 
A minimum of $35 million in public dollars were initially announced to be invested by 
the city to rebuild the area’s infrastructure, with that sum to be recovered from the future tax 
revenues resulting from the expected development (Chicago Tribune, June 12, 1998). 
Additionally, it was estimated that the revenues generated by private investment were to round 
up to $114 million and that 4,100 new jobs were to be created from this investment (City of 
Chicago, 1998).   
Yet, the announcement of the TIFs fueled animosity among many Pilsen residents. 
Formal protest was almost immediate, as illustrated in the following newspaper account: “On the 
second Tuesday in March [1998], with the City Hall elevators chiming in the background, 
Carlos Arango … stood in front of a hundred Pilsen residents waving yellow-and-black sheets of 
paper that displayed the acronym ‘TIF’ crossed out. This was the seventh time in as many 
months that Pilsen residents had gone downtown to protest the Pilsen TIF” (in Lutton, 1998). 
Energizing opposition to the TIFs was a spate of criticisms (figures 3 and 4). Their concerns 
focused on the type and quality of jobs that would be created from this endeavor, the lack of 
influence by community members and owners of industries over how the TIF dollars were to be 
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spent, and possible expansion of the TIF border to include other commercial districts (see Lutton, 
1998). Major concerns were also expressed about the potential land use conversion from 
industrial to residential if the alderman supported a zoning change that would attract residential 
loft developers (Hague and Curran, 2008). The fear, then, was about the gentrification of the 
community. As the criticisms and questions over the TIF proposal escalated, the alderman 
anticipated an ongoing contestation in Pilsen: “... every development project in Pilsen has been 
questioned” (in Lutton, 1998).  
Figure 3: Murals expressing discontent and fear of displacement in Pilsen (1) 
  
 
Source: Photograph taken by the author (February 2010) 
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Figure 4: Mural expressing discontent and fear of displacement in Pilsen (2)  
 
 
Source: Photograph taken by the author (February 2010) 
In this context, the redevelopment governance (builders, developers, and the city) 
aggressively responded. They contested these criticisms by offering, in community meetings, 
city pronouncements, and planning meetings an uncompromising discourse of the need for this 
community to be transformed.  Here this TIF and a broader redevelopment of Pilsen was served 
up as an “inevitable project” that was a recipe to saving the community from acute decay and 
eclipse. In a deft discourse, these renditions were complemented with visual rhetoric (imaginary 
spaces in discourse) that actively solidified the virtues and benefits of the TIF.  
 The TIF incentive was presented by the media and the City Council as an entrepreneurial 
and positive idea to create new patterns of consumption and production.  In a Chicago Tribune 
editorial, for example, a member of the City Council noted: “the idea is to boost economic 
renewal (…) where it otherwise wouldn’t take place. (…) with the addition of Pilsen and two 
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other zones approved by the Council on Wednesday, the city now has 54 of the special districts” 
(Chicago Tribune, June 11, 1998). Pronouncements about the salvation of Pilsen from becoming 
a dilapidated neighborhood also grounded discussions about the positive effects of the TIF in 
boosting the neighborhood’s economy: “Isn’t a viable industrial corridor with 15 firms and 
7,800 jobs [previously announced 4,100] one road to salvation? What about our lively 18th 
Street and Cermak Road commercial districts and cultural and social institutions?” (Chicago 
Tribune, February 13, 1998). The following quote illustrates similar themes: “Pilsen residents 
trying to make a living and improve their lot--that is, the vast majority of [the]  population--
should feel relieved that … and the city can finally move with a redevelopment that could bring 
as many as 4,100 jobs to the area” (Chicago Tribune, June 12, 1998). Ultimately, these 
renditions fit the neoliberal project perfectly, times had supposedly changed and Pilsen needed to 
achieve prosperity and long term, self-sufficient growth much like previously ‘dilapidated’ but 
gentrified neighborhoods Wicker Park, Bucktown, and Lincoln Park (see Crain’s Chicago 
Business, 2005).  
Additionally, pronouncements of inevitable and benevolent change were offered in the 
form of narratives that contained two mental/imaginary spaces (see table 2): a current “decrepit 
Pilsen” and its direct antithesis, a “prosperous and orderly ethnoscape”. These imaginary spaces 
in discourse attacked two things: Pilsen’s physical setting and its large Mexican-American 
population. They together offered a logical site for redevelopment that needed a new aesthetic 
and more civic-industrious-minded people. Following Liam Kennedy (2000), before 
communities can be restructured, they must be devalued, prepared for development, and 
reimagined as a place of value. Such devaluing can take many forms, according to Kennedy, but 
typically entails a reality being made of easily discardable people and social life. 
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The first space, a “ravaged/depressed space,” rendered Pilsen a derelict and chaotic 
territory. Physical degeneration was purportedly ubiquitous and entrenched in this terrain. 
Narratives referred to the selected TIF area as “the oldest 907-acre industrial zone with decrepit 
infrastructure that needed to be rebuilt” (Chicago Tribune, June 12, 1998).  The local media, in 
articles, also depicted Pilsen as an “outlying neighborhood …one of the oldest neighborhoods in 
Chicago, (…) [that] (…) with its narrow streets and crumbling vaulted sidewalks, [which] 
desperately needs special attention” (Chicago Tribune, February 11, 1998).   
This rendition of a “ravaged/depressed space” also contained local stereotypes of 
Mexican communities: poverty-ridden families, people clustered in rundown buildings, and 
crime-drug-ridden streets (see Delgado, 1999). Comments by a local developer put it best: 
“Pilsen has become, quite simply, a crime-ridden slum ... a Mexican ghetto. It is now less a 
place for decent people and decent families. The streets have become dangerous, the kids outside 
[on the streets] are destructive ... it is a neighborhood that needs to be changed. Hell, I wouldn't 
let my kids or any decent person I know walk these streets'” (in Wilson et al., 2004). In this 
presentation of Pilsen, there were few positive signs of a stable and orderly community (positive 
street life, progressive families, quiet kids, decent schools). In this way, this visual rhetoric 
served up for Chicago residents a common stereotype: the sense of a broken-down, crowded, 
crime-infested Mexican barrio. Mexican-Americans, with a long history of being distinctively 
stereotyped in Chicago (see Delgado, 1999) were reduced to these afflicting, coded images.  
These pathologies purportedly stretched across the entirety of a space as the Chicago Tribune 
narrates: “Ald. Danny Solis (25th) has crusaded against gangs and drunk and disorderly conduct 
in his ward since he was appointed 18 months ago” (Chicago Tribune, September 25, 1997).  
Additionally, when the public debate about the TIF started, a Chicago Tribune editorial 
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expressed the great failure of the Mexican residents for not allowing progress to come to Pilsen 
(Chicago Tribune, June 12, 1998). Pilsen residents were cast as underachievers who were 
unwilling to take advantage of the good economic times that fostered Pilsen’s standing as “an 
island of poverty amid booming communities” (Chicago Tribune, June 12, 1998).  
Moreover, renditions of an ideal space – a Mexican-Latino ethnoscape – were continuous 
and stood in symbolically for what Pilsen could be. Here was the imagined space of the ideal, the 
marker for what Pilsen should become and needed to become. As an offered imaginary that was 
designed to discipline the public imagining about what was “the proper community,” this 
idealized Latinoscape was made the yardstick against which the community was to be 
understood. Thus, a local planner stated in bold pronouncement that Pilsen “lacked the Mexican 
barrio’s sense of social stability and ethnic cohesion … it’s a simple fact … the TIF district 
could change this …” (in Wilson et al., 2004). Here, as plain as day, Pilsen was lacking and 
dysfunctional and the reason the TIF designation was necessary. Similarly the Chicago Tribune 
notes, in discussing the need for the TIF: “When Pilsen finally prospers, some displacement 
undoubtedly will occur. But along with it will come increased property values and equity that 
will greatly benefit the area's homeowners” (Chicago Tribune, June 12, 1998). 
Yet, the physical transformation of the TIF-designated area was not complete until 2004 
when a 387-unit condo was chosen to locate there (Chicago Journal, 2010). As mentioned, the 
Pilsen TIF was intended to preserve the industrial job base of factories and warehouses in a large 
manufacturing area near the Stevenson Expressway and Western Avenue (Joravsky, 2006). 
Despite these stated intentions, in 2004, the City Council, with support from alderman Danny 
Solis, amended the industrial TIF to allow for a special district zoning at 18h Street and Peoria 
(Hague and Curran, 2006). A consortium of developers – Mota Construction Company, Kimball 
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Hill Suburban Centers, and City View administrator (former HUD head) Henry Cisneros – 
pushed to advance plans to build 387 condominiums, one parking space for each unit, and 
commercial uses in 13 buildings, ranging from townhouses to ten-story towers. While 21 percent 
of the units were supposed to be “affordable” (starting at $150,000), market rate units 
(condominiums, townhouses, and loft home) were planned to be priced from $250,000 to 
$700,000 (Stangenes, 2006).  
Besides Solis backing the project, supporters said it would help keep young professionals 
in the neighborhood as well as provide affordable housing (Stangenes, 2006). Yet, in the process 
of getting the necessary approval, the governance faced residents’ opposition.  This initiative 
energized opposition amongst Pilsen residents, who complained that Solis was using the TIF as a 
tool to spur gentrification and squeeze out working-class residents (Joravsky, 2006; Stangenes, 
2006). Solis countered that there just weren't that many factories and warehouses looking to 
come to Pilsen (Interview with Professor of Geography in Chicago, March 5, 2010). 
Additionally, critics stated that the high cost of the units at the site would exercise speculative 
pressure on both industrial and residential rents in the surrounding area, leading to displacement 
of lower-income residents (Stangenes, 2006). In November 2005, a rally protesting against the 
proposed development was held at the intersection of 18
th
 and Peoria.  
This was exactly the development the community feared in 1998 when the TIF was 
declared, and it was the central reason for the formation of the Pilsen Alliance. Created in 1998, 
Pilsen Alliance became an independent, very active community organization in Pilsen that 
advocates for the Latino community in terms of housing, education, and other social matters.
16
 
                                                             
16
 As the website states, the goal of Pilsen Alliance  is to” improve the quality of life and to preserve the rich 
Mexican culture of the greater Pilsen community through the process of seeking and developing local leadership at 
the grassroots level to work on advocacy/organizing campaigns that emphasize and promote self determination, 
accountability and inclusiveness.” (Pilsen Alliance website, retrieved March 2010, www.thepilsenalliance.org/).  
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Ultimately, in order to secure this development, Mota Construction and Kimball Hill contributed 
$31,150 and $4,000, respectively, to Solis's organization in 2004 (in Joravsky, 2006). Moreover, 
City View (Henry’s Cisneros construction company) sent a check for $2,500 on August 16, 
2005, just a few months before he announced the condominium plans (Figure5).  
All in all, despite all these “efforts” to secure the necessary land conversion in a 
supposedly non-attractive area to build industries, four years later Kimball Hill announced opting 
for chapter 11 bankruptcy. The company is still trying to find either a buyer for the land or 
possibly even a new partner for the project. “With a particular development of this size, the 
numbers didn’t work. We were just waiting for market conditions to improve”, Doug Guthrie, 
president of Kimball Hill’s urban centers division, was quoted in the Chicago Journal. He added, 
“We weren’t out very long until the market turned bad” (Chicago Journal, 2010).  
Figure 5: Vacant land prepared for Centro 18 construction  
 
Source: www.yochicago.com (retrieved February 2008) 
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 Expanding East Pilsen with an artist community colony and a parking lot 
Shortly after the construction in the 1960s of the Dan Ryan Expressway, mega-city 
developer John Podmajersky became interested in purchasing property in Pilsen to preserve it 
from demolition with the hope of future redevelopment (Isaacs, 2003). “My father was very 
concerned about the deterioration of Pilsen and wanted to do something to rejuvenate the 
neighborhood”, expressed his son, John Podmajersky III (Weber, 1992). To this end, and 
envisioning possible profitability, Podmajersky’s family became one of the most powerful real-
estate landlords and coordinators of Pilsen artistic-cultural events.  
This family persisted as a major developer in Pilsen over the decades and has been one 
central actor responsible for the social and economic changes that have occurred in East Pilsen 
since that time (Interview with Spanish Housing for Improvement representative October, 2009; 
and with Professor of Geography in Chicago, November 10, 2009). Along Halsted Street, 
between 17th and South Canalport Avenue, the Podmajersky’s own dozens of properties on 
Halsted (although never publicly declared, this family supposedly owns about one hundred 
properties, in Hague and Curran, 2006). They purchased properties over the years with an eye on 
a massive areal redevelopment.    
John Podmajersky and his father grew up in Pilsen. When he began buying buildings (in 
the 1960s), the community was purportedly “in total disarray” (in Lutton, 1998). To him, the 
neighborhood had been gutted by the construction of the Dan Ryan, many businesses had left, 
and “Halsted Street was mostly taverns” (in Lutton, 1998). Thus, eager to stabilize and upgrade 
the neighborhood, and seduced by possibilities for lucrative redevelopment, Podmajersky 
assumed the task of creating an artist colony enclave here as the following quote notes:  
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“The betterment of the neighborhood didn’t just happen—
someone had to be orchestrating it. It wasn’t the government, it 
wasn’t the church, the community groups. They had very little 
grasp of what the hell was the problem of how to create 
communities that work, you know, taking a very sick, dysfunctional 
neighborhood and turning it around. It was like literally 
transplanting a different type of user basically” (in Lutton, 1998).  
 
 
Podmajersky’s blunt pronouncement offers a struggling and impoverished Pilsen and 
desires to upgrade it. At the core of this, his discourse uses an array of terms and/or metaphors
17
 
that obliterate any sense of contradictory and complexity about Pilsen’s physical setting and 
identities. Previous renditions of Pilsen as an ‘old’, ‘depressed’, and ‘deteriorated’ neighborhood 
are in line with his rendition of a “sick and dysfunctional” community that implies a sense of 
chaotic and pathological terrain (see table 2). Additionally, it suggests an urgency to re-make 
Pilsen into something it purportedly is not:  a livable and vibrant community (using 
Podmajersky’s words, to “create communities that work”, in Lutton, 1998). This narrative also 
communicates the sense of rebuilding Pilsen’s social character. Moreover, his references to 
“transplanting a different type of user” (see Lutton, 1998) suggest that the current Pilseneros 
(Pilsen residents) are not the ones entitled to live in the neighborhood. In the following quote, 
Podmajersky openly states who he envisions to be ideal residents: “I started renting it to artists, 
and when I discovered what they’re about, I said, these are the people I’m gonna bring around” 
(in Lutton, 1998).  
Other pronouncements embody Podmajersky’s offering of urgency to redevelop Pilsen. 
His pronouncements, again, vilify two things, Pilsen’s physical settings and population. Thus, he 
compares the east side of Pilsen to the blight of a war-torn nation during a news conference: 
                                                             
17
 This rendition of Pilsen profoundly resonates with the metaphor of the city as an organism that lives, dies, and 
eventually becomes sick, widely used by the Chicago School of Urban Sociology during the early 1920s and later 
widely criticized. However, these metaphors are still present in people’s narratives and descriptions about cities and 
more in particular, in developers’ visions. 
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 "Halsted Street looks like the Ho Chi Minh Trail during the height of the Vietnam War, 
filled with potholes, deteriorating curbs, broken street lighting, collapsing sidewalks and a 
decade of unfulfilled promises for improvements, new parks and better services," (Chicago 
Tribune, Jun 11, 1998). He also spoke boldly to the media about “the problem of gangs and 
drugs…that have made this community [Pilsen] a problem place” (in Wilson, 2006). Again, 
these renditions run roughshod over any sense of a complex and contradictory reality. To 
Podmajersky, Pilsen does not contain any serious amount of social, cultural, or demographic 
heterogeneity. Rather, it is an easily understood, monolithic place whose physical and social 
content cries out for a needed transformation.   
Yet, over the years, Podmajersky and family have faced contestation from Pilsen’s residents 
and activists. A sense of frustration and irritation emanates through Podmajersky’s renditions 
about Pilsen’s activism: the resident’s mission “is to thwart upgrading at every turn,” “keep the 
neighborhood the same … as a Mexican barrio … keep it from modernizing”… [Pilsen today is 
known] as “the explosive neighborhood where angry Latinos meet attempts to upgrade” (in 
Wilson et al. 2004).  
 Virulent opposition to the emergent upscaling appeared in 1998. With the support of Pilsen’s 
alderman, Podmajersky planned to convert 70 percent of a vacant city-owned lot on 19th Place 
and Sangamon into a parking lot to accommodate an enhanced demand for parking from nascent 
gentrifiers: “I need to purchase this property to provide secured, landscaped, and paved off 
street parking spaces for my upcoming development of three large loft buildings” (in Lutton, 
1998). The rest of the land was planned to be transformed into a 15,000-square-foot Neighbor 
Space garden (Chicago Tribune, June 18, 1999). The parking lot project ended up escalating a 
major debate among Pilsen’s residents. Activist and neighborhood gardener Al DiFranco 
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pronounced the following: “The neighborhood has been consulted on this, and we wanted to 
save the garden in the more aesthetically pleasing gateway location. Solis wants to move it over 
here so he can give the better location to his campaign contributor [Podmajersky]. And we don't 
like that” (Chicago Tribune, June 18, 1999). In addition, Ramona Reyes, who has lived on 19th 
Place for 20 years, was not pleased with this initiative: “It's not just” she said in Spanish, “The 
parking lot would not even be for us, the people who live here” (Chicago Tribune, June 18, 
1999).  
Figure 6: Pilsen residents protest proposed Podmajersky parking lot   
 
Source: www.chicago.indymedia.org  (retrieved June 2007) 
But after heated debate (see Washburn, 1998), an important aspect dominated the decision to 
transform the vacant city-owned place into a parking lot: strong support by Pilsen’s alderman 
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closely tied to Podmajersky’s financial contributions (thousands of dollars were donated to the 
Solis campaign, in Lutton, 1998). Firmly endorsing the building of the parking space, Solis 
noted: “One of the biggest needs is community gardens. But we also have a need for parking 
spaces” (Chicago Tribune, June 18, 1999). In response to this, John Podmajersky III noted: “I 
think Danny [Solis] is taking a lot of initiatives. He opens things up to the community, he takes 
input from people. I mean, he’s the best alderman that I’ve ever seen around here” (in Lutton, 
1998).   
Currently, Podmajersky continues to develop the eastern area of Pilsen, pushing to clear 
more land for artists and wealthier incomers. Under the rhetoric of “building Soho in Chicago”, 
(see Figure7), Podmajersky III heads the Pilsen East Planning Association, a group comprised of 
about 100 businesses and property owners along South Halsted and between 16
th
 and Canalport 
Avenue (Podmajersky Inc., 2003). According to its website, the result has been a successful 
housing operation. Many fine Chicago businesses “and more than 1,500 creative entrepreneurs” 
(Podmajersky Inc., 2003) have prospered in a period of five decades. To the Pilsen East Planning 
Association, this rise of more affluent residents and more upscale shops must continue for Pilsen 
to flourish. 
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Figure 7: Podmajersky’s website advertisement 
  
Source: www.podmajersky.com (retrieved September 2009) 
 
 University of Illinois at Chicago (UIC) expansion  
Another project was at the center of changing Pilsen. It also provoked controversy in the 
neighborhood. Between 2000 and 2007, $600 million in public funds were invested to expand 
the University of Illinois at Chicago (UIC). The idea, the brain-child of the University’s Board of 
Trustees, was to build an integrated academic, residential, recreational, and commercial 
development to enhance the UIC community. Known as the “South Campus Project” (UIC South 
Campus Development Project, 2003), this redevelopment extended south to the area known as 
the Maxwell Street Market.  
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Briefly, Maxwell Street, immediately north of Pilsen, was the historic home for 
immigrants arriving from Europe, Latin America, and southern U.S. states. In need of jobs, 
entrepreneurs came to Maxwell St., which was said to be the largest open air market in the 
country (see “Cheat You Fair: The Story of Maxwell Street” website). From clothes to cars and 
appliances, Maxwell Street offered discount items to consumers and was an economic hub for 
the poor looking to get ahead: “Maxwell Street was the precursor to America's discount malls 
and pioneered the concept of combining retail selling with entertainment” (Openair-Market, 
2010). It also became known as a milieu of culture and ethnicity. Maxwell Street was 
particularly associated with Blues, gospel music, and Jazz “as many of the Jazz bands would buy 
their clothing down on Maxwell Street” (Openair-Market, 2010).  
Over the years, the Market’s land became increasingly valuable as it was located next to 
UIC and was close to downtown Chicago. Initially, the UIC campus was situated on the Navy 
Pier. But in 1965 Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley, father of Richard M. Daley, decided to move 
the building and turned it into a full-fledged public university in its current location along South 
Halsted Street. In doing so, Daley’s administration displaced about 5,000 residents to make room 
for the university’s 103-acre campus (Bentacur, 2005).  Three decades later, UIC decided to 
aggressively expand its campus and build upscale housing and glittering retail nodes near Pilsen 
(Marx, 1997). In the 1980s, after years of resistance by concerned citizens and historical 
preservationists, the City of Chicago finally sold the Harrison/Halsted area to the UIC
18
.  Finally, 
                                                             
18 Its campus was initially located at the Harrison/Halsted area in 1965. The university slowly began buying land in 
the Maxwell area and demolishing the buildings. It had been rumored that the University never officially announced 
their plans in the '80s, but circulated speculation that they were going to exercise eminent domain, which was in fact 
backed by state legislation. This strategy may have saved the school millions of dollars, not only because people 
slowly moved out and did not have to be compensated, but also because real estate prices continued to drop in the 
area through the '80s and early '90s, because of the rumors. When the school finally made public its' plans to move 
the Maxwell Street Market and demolish the buildings, the community tried to petition to list the Maxwell Street 
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in August 1994, the Maxwell Street Market was demolished to accommodate the UIC expansion 
and a much smaller version was relocated a few blocks east to Canal Street and renamed the 
“New Maxwell Street Market” in September 1994 (see Jordan, 2000). In August 2000, the UIC 
campus expansion finally began, led by a consortium of developers, builders, UIC administration 
(Board of Trustees), and the local government (Alderman Solis, Mayor Daley, and the 
Department of Planning and Development). This project built 913 housing units and mixed-use 
commercial redevelopment (new condominiums, town houses, and university dormitories) for 
campus residents, students, and scholars across 68 acres (Bentacur, 2005).  Today, the area is a 
sparkling testimonial to land revalorization and dramatic upscaling.  
Interestingly, the project did not directly target Pilsen itself, but raised concerns among 
residents and institutions of a desire to transform the general area that would soon include Pilsen. 
Their concerns were valid: UIC's proposed campus expansion adjoined Pilsen and the land 
valorization could easily diffuse across Pilsen. This campus expansion thus reawakened 
community concerns that within three years became a reality. By the early 2000s, gentrification 
and expected increases in rents and property taxes were forcing local businesses and working-
class Hispanics out of the predominantly Mexican-immigrant neighborhood adjacent to UIC 
(Garza, 1997; Marx, 1997): Commenting in the early 2000s, Honoratus Lopez of Pilsen Realty 
(in Feely, 2005) noted:"Rents already are rising on the east side of Pilsen. A two-bedroom 
apartment near 18th Street and Ashland Avenue costs $300 a month, he said, while east of 
Halsted Street it can go from $700 to $800."   
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Market area on the National Register of Historic Places as a historic district, in 1994 and again in 2000. Yet, the 
proposal was eventually turned down due to the efforts of the university, backed by Mayor Richard M. Daley.  
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Thereafter, sympathy for Pilsen residents, activist organizations, street vendors, and 
preservationists gained a foothold in Pilsen. Thus, during community meetings, these actors 
publicized their concerns about this threat to Pilsen with much community support (Melcer, 
1997). Concerns centered around displacing residents and changes in the ethnic character of the 
neighborhood: To Maxwell street vendor Anselmo Valentin (in Garza, 1997) at a community 
development meeting, “the University of Illinois wants to get rid of minorities, and we are not 
going to permit it. We are going to organize and we are going to fight.” Similarly, to resident 
and restaurant co-owner Carmen Velazquez, “We do not want Pilsen to be Lincoln Park. We 
want to keep the history. We want to keep the culture. This could be the last hurrah for this 
community if we do not stop it now” (in Melcer, 1997).   
 
Figure 8: University Village (townhouses and condos)   
 
Source: Photograph taken by the author (February 2010)  
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Figure 9: UIC Forum (conference center) 
 
Source: Photograph taken by the author (February 2010)  
 
But while these pronouncements inundated the area, neoliberal redevelopment 
governance contested these assertions by speaking aggressively of redevelopment here as 
inevitable, inexorable, and saving Pilsen from imminent decay. As the Chicago Tribune Editorial  
noted:  “community groups in Pilsen should be prepared… and get ready to benefit from the new 
development. That could involve construction contracts, retail opportunities in the new 
development to be built along Halsted Street or jobs at the University.” (Chicago Tribune, March 
16, 1997).  
These pronouncements were rooted in a rhetoric that served up at its center a current 
“ravaged/decrepit” Pilsen that cried out to be redeveloped into a potential “prosperous and 
orderly ethnoscape”.  This “decrepit space” was eloquently invoked by UIC Chancellor David 
Broski (ChicagoTribune, December 13, 1997) who expressed the need to “transform the 
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[University] campus from an arid, Stonehenge -by-the-Eisenhower for commuters, into a more 
hospitable residential academic enclave.” Similarly, interviews with city planners noted this 
thematic: “Maxwell Street and its surroundings were from a bygone era ... decay and 
deterioration infested the area. The South Campus Project offered the hope of a rebirth ... a re-
awakening” (in Wilson et al., 2004).  
Moreover, renditions of an imaginary ‘prosperous and orderly ethnoscape’ in Pilsen 
grounded the redevelopment discussions and constituted a rationale to normalize the 
transformation of the neighborhood. This imagined Pilsen was a specific construct set up as the 
direct antithesis of the ‘current depressed area’. It communicated an array of things that the 
current Pilsen supposedly lacked: orderly community and streets, sense of prosperity, and 
cohesiveness. These themes were well illustrated by the UIC consortium (UIC administration 
officials, local government, and prominent developers
19
) in charge of the UIC expansion:  
“Over the past 15 years, the University of Illinois at 
Chicago has blossomed into a first-rate urban academic institution 
and its expansion plans are welcome signs of this continued 
growth . (…) community groups in Pilsen should be prepared (…) 
and get ready to benefit from the new development. That could 
involve construction contracts, retail opportunities in the new 
development to be built along Halsted Street or jobs at the 
University (Chicago Tribune, March 16, 1997). 
 
(…)The Latinos of Pilsen, one of the more economically 
depressed areas in the city, should be rejoicing at the prospect of 
such a windfall right next door” (Chicago Tribune, December 13, 
1997).  
 
 
Additionally, Pilsen’s redevelopment supposedly sought to restore social cohesiveness in 
families and the neighborhood. A UIC administrator put it remarkably well: “The redevelopment 
of Pilsen …will restore coherence and harmony to this neighborhood that has long since 
                                                             
19 For example, Mesirow Stein Real Estate Inc. was proposed as a master developer. 
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disappeared” (Interview with UIC administrator, in Wilson et al., 2004). This idea of a cohesive 
and prosperous Pilsen, as opposed to what currently exists, was communicated as the ideal state 
of the neighborhood (Chicago Tribune, February 13, 1998).  
All in all, these discourses strived to successfully “sell” a distinctive way to know a 
“normal” and “civic” Pilsen. As such, negotiations and sporadic contestations failed to seriously 
blunt the gentrification initiative. As Maxwell Street Market was demolished (this name was 
quickly replaced with a new urban icon: “University-Village area”, figures 8 and 9), and the UIC 
mix development was moving forward, the impacts of the UIC developments became 
pronounced by 1999: “more than 5,000 people were displaced, 200 businesses were forced out of 
the community, and some 800 homes razed” (in Bentacur, 2005:33).   
 The impacts of the South Campus project on the housing and rental prices in the 
neighborhood were significant. Pilsen’s property values and rents, historically lower than the 
Chicago median, climbed rapidly. To a study conducted by the Voorhees Center in 2000, the 
eastern census tract 3103 adjacent to University Village had the highest median owner-occupied 
property value in the area at $270,000, indicating a 547 % increase between 1990 and 2000. In 
terms of rents, the median gross rent in Pilsen has also been historically lower than that of 
Chicago. Between 1990 and 2000 the median gross rent rose 47.7% for the entire Lower West 
Side as compared to the city of Chicago’s increase of 38.43%. The 2003 Pilsen Rent Study 
Reports that average rent levels in Pilsen increased 9.5 ($200) per year between1990-2000. This 
study also shows that the eastern census tracts are undergoing a progressive change with a 
decreasing Latino and foreign-born presence and decreasing household densities (Glesne et. al, 
2003). 
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 Chantico Lofts redevelopment  
As redevelopment in and around Pilsen gained momentum, the sense of an inevitable 
transformation of the area became increasingly articulated.  In this context, Lipe Properties 
Company aggressively interfaced with the Pilsen community by building the Chantico Lofts 
residential project. This well known local developer
20
 proceeded by successfully applying for a 
zoning variance in 2005. The development, at 16th and Carpenter (Figure 10, 1 and 2), recycled 
a four-story, 44,000-square-foot brick warehouse (Lipe Properties website, 2009). For most of 
the 20th century, this site was a factory (Hague and Curran, 2008). In 2005, the building was 
sold to developer Lipe Property Company who announced its intention to convert it to 
condominiums. The resulting 42 units, completed in 2007, were sold for $150,000 to $375,000 
each. 
Zoning became a tool to further drive the gentrification of Pilsen at this point. To explain 
the zoning change process in more detail, zoning regulates both the nature of land uses and 
building densities. In Chicago, there are zoning categories for residential (RS, RT, RM), 
commercial (C), business (B), and manufacturing (M), as well as special zoning designations for 
planned manufacturing districts (PMD), planned developments (PD), and parks and open space 
areas (POS). Subcategories (e.g., RT-4, B3-2) refer to specific features of the allowed buildings 
and land uses. Each zoning category has a floor-to-area ratio (FAR) that determines how large a 
building on a given site can be (Hague and Curran, 2008).  
                                                             
20 Since 1994, “Centrum completed a wide variety of commercial and residential projects in Chicago during Tipe's 
tenure including: the redevelopment of the former Montgomery Ward's headquarters campus in River North into a 
new neighborhood, construction of the North Avenue Collection at Sheffield Street and North Avenue in Lincoln 
Park, and the construction of Churchill Row Lofts & Rowhomes in Bucktown” (Lipe properties website, retrieved 
May 10, 2010). 
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To Hague and Curran (2008), Pilsen’s zoning has made it a target for developers 
interested in inducing gentrification.  Much of the neighborhood is zoned RT-4, which allows for 
multi-unit buildings and a height of 38 feet. As such, many of the existing buildings were at 
relatively low heights and densities compared to the RT-4 zoning designation. Developers 
quickly lobbied aggressively to get Pilsen’s zoning changed to incorporate this more density-
permitting zoning.  Before the City, a multiplicity of developers stepped forth to push the city to 
re-zone Pilsen. They argued that the area could easily accommodate this new zoning, residents 
were desirous of it, and a flurry of new private-sector reinvestment in the area would follow (see 
Hague and Curran, 2008) 
21
.  
                                                             
21 Additionally, a mismatch between existing zoning designation and actual land use is also an issue for industrial 
users. There are multiple sites that are being used for industrial purposes but are zoned for residential use. This 
zoning mismatch makes business owners vulnerable, especially if they rent their space. Because residential usage 
has a far higher rate of return than manufacturing, industrial space that can legally be converted to residential use is 
highly profitable to developers. One such site is Chantico Loft. Here, a first zoning change (from industrial to 
residential use) was granted by the City Council without the community input or city oversight (Hague and Curran, 
2008).  The second zoning request change, for higher density (from RT-4 to RM-5) had to pass through the Pilsen 
Zoning Board created in November 2004.  In this setting, Pilsen residents and organizations pushed to have an 
active voice and vote in the redevelopment projects approval (see Hague and Curran, 2008; Chicago Tribune April 
22, 2005).  
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Figure 10: Chantico Loft: 1. Before construction 
 
Source: www.yochicago.com (retrieved March 2012)  
            2. After construction 
 
Source: Photograph taken by the author (May 2010) 
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Many Pilsen residents were angered by this developer maneuver. But their ability to 
influence this zoning decision ultimately proved futile. As a mere advisory voice before the City, 
their concerns were expressed in vivid detail. More than 25 Pilsen residents spoke before the city 
of the neighborhood harmful effects of this act, but it proved to no avail
22
 (see Hague and 
Curran, 2008). In 2005, Pilsen’s zoning was changed to allow for more dense and vertical 
development.  
But protest was effective in another realm. Tensions between developers and grassroot 
organizations in Pilsen escalated when Lipe Property Company decided to change the name of 
the condominium project. In line with the process of Pilsen’s ethnic commodification, the former 
condo complex name, “Lerner Box”, was changed to “Chantico Lofts”, in reference to the 
popular Aztec goddess of heart and home (Avila, 2005). Although this could be understood as a 
strategy to respect the ethnic character of Pilsen, it generated controversy.  The new name fueled 
direct opposition of some activists, for example from the Executive Director of the Pilsen 
Alliance "(…). How dare they use the community's icons to displace us?" (…) You're going to 
use the virgin [Chantico] to sell us some expensive condos?" (Chicago Tribune, April 22, 2005), 
(Figure 11).   
 
 
 
 
                                                             
22 “A downzoning referendum was placed on the March 2006 ballot. The referendum read, “Shall the Alderman of 
the 25th Ward and the City Council downzone Pilsen from RT-4 to RS-3, to slow down gentrification?” The attempt  
was to maintain the scale of the buildings and reduce the current trends of condominium construction in this historic 
neighborhood.  Although the referendum passed with 75% of the vote, in May 2006, an official speaking on behalf 
of Alderman Solis (25th) at a community meeting called by the Pilsen Alliance stated that the alderman would not 
enact a downzoning of Pilsen (for more information see Hague and Curran, 2008). 
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Figure 11: Virgen Chantico 
 
Source: Photograph taken by the author (February 2010) 
 
 
Protest also came from Pilsen Alliance. They declared that this name change was an affront to 
the integrity and character of Pilsen, what one resident noted to me as “ slur of  a name on us ..  
this was capital coming in and trying to tell us and the outside world what we were ..”(Interview, 
March 25, 2010). 
This controversy had an immediate incendiary period that lasted about three months (see 
Chicago Tribune, April 22, 2005). While representatives of the real-estate community argued, 
“Housing and commercial development is not a threat to Pilsen. It is a lever to improve the lives 
of its residents and stabilize the community” (Chicago Tribune, April 25, 2005), representatives 
of Pilsen organizations pronounced, “We need to send a message to developers that it's not going 
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to be a walk in the park to develop Pilsen" (Chicago Tribune, April 25, 2005). Yet, more 
significantly to this study than the contestation itself is how developers and builders, supported 
by the city, actively cultivated and worked through people’s values,  perceptions, and 
sensibilities, in this case through the use of ethnic symbols, to normalize the aesthetic and 
symbolic transformation of the neighborhood. The symbolic (arguably material) name change 
constituted a kind of disciplining and extolling of Pilsen’s ethnic character. That is, ethnic 
distinction became a heavily commodified tool to make certain community sections more 
appealing to outsiders, developers, and businesses. Without conspicuous display and 
commodification, the “Mexicaness” in Pilsen was worth little. In this sense, by commodifying 
and showcasing Pilsen through the use of ethnic symbols such as the Aztec goddess Chantico, 
neoliberal redevelopment governance redefined Pilsen’s character as an ‘ethnic oriented 
neighborhood’23. As such, Pilsen could conceivably contribute to the economic health and 
vibrancy of the city.  
And as land use conversions and condominium construction accelerated
24
, sections of the 
media continued to present redevelopment in Pilsen as an inevitable process. When referring to 
the potential construction of Chantico Loft, a Chicago Tribune editorial expressed the following: 
“From the rooftops of Pilsen, the Loop seems close enough to touch. Redevelopment of Pilsen's 
housing and commercial stock is not going to be stopped unless the city puts a fence around it 
and declares it an official poverty zone” (Chicago Tribune, April 25, 2005).  
                                                             
23 As opposed to a rooted-working class neighborhood advocated by the Pilsen community (Interview with 
representative of Pilsen Alliance, March 25, 2010). 
24 “In 2004, a zoning change for a condominium project in 1915 S. Racine Street was requested. Two years later, a -
new condominium had been built at the location. In 2005, Cook County assessed the westernmost lot (on the right) 
at $7,318. The building that was once located there has since been demolished and been replaced by four 
condominiums with a combined Cook County assessed value of $170,796 in 2006. In 2006 one condominium 
remained unsold. It has 3 bedrooms and 2.5 bathrooms and is marketed by one of Chicago’s leading real estate 
agencies as offering “jawdropping drama” for $449,900” (Hague and Curran, 2008:26). 
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Finally, the material effects of these conversions were remarkable. Within two years of the 
governance’s bold foray into Pilsen, physical alteration was discernable. Suddenly, spruced-up, 
condos and homes dotted the Halsted Street corridor and became a kind of symbolic gateway 
through which one could identify a changing, more capital-attracting neighborhood. Thus, 
between 2004 and 2006 and with 5,002 lots being inventoried, 43% of properties in Pilsen 
experienced a 25-49 percent increase in their assessed values, with an additional 23 percent 
experiencing a 50-74 percent increase in assessed values (Hague and Curran, 2008; Martinez, 
2009). In addition, 24 properties experienced an increase of over 125 percent in assessed value. 
In all, the neighborhood averaged increased from $30,000 to over $200,000. (It is estimated that 
a $1,000 increase in assessed value leads to a $165 increase in property taxes.) In this context of 
accelerating investment, the city stepped in and designated Pilsen a historic district. The key 
theme became the need to cultivate an ethnic oriented neighborhood for tourism and popular 
consumption whose specifics I now discuss.  
 Touristic and historical preservation initiatives  
Historically, Pilsen has been one of the principal neighborhoods in Chicago that has 
hosted popular festivals (e.g. Fiesta del Sol, Cinco de Mayo) and offered a variety of cultural 
events, such as weekly ferias and museums events. Creating murals and graffiti, moreover, has 
been an important source of residents’ expression and social activity. This endeavor has 
traditionally been a source of intense community pride and the assertion of desires for self-
determination (Bentacur, 2005), (see figures 12 and 13). Other murals, as previously shown,   
depict the fears of gentrification, displacement, and eviction (Figure 14). The artists have often 
been local residents and, occasionally, outside artists typically working on a pro bono basis to 
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help the community give voice to resident sentiments.  However, during the early 2000s, with 
redevelopment advancing steadily, these expressions have been resignified and commodified by 
the city government as a means of attracting touristic businesses and investment in the 
neighborhood.  In 2003, Alderman Solis, notorious for supporting this commodification of Pilsen 
while trying to balance this with community concerns, publicly expressed that Pilsen is “to 
become the best Mexican-American community in the Midwest, where you can come taste the 
food and experience the culture” (Chicago Sun Times, March 17, 2003). 
To this end, Solis initiated a series of policies to attract tourism and aestheticize the 
neighborhood with the focus on extolling the ‘authentic Mexican character’ of Pilsen. Tourism in 
Pilsen became a major development initiative and industry and since early 2000, the alderman 
has been one of the main advocates (see PPC-Quality-of-Life-Plan, 2006). For example, the city 
has conducted a series of initiatives such as creating a detailed walking tour map of Pilsen’s 
famous murals throughout the area, providing free trolley rides through the area, initiating tourist 
buses that highlight recent changes in Pilsen, and sponsoring and financial underwriting of the 
Mexican Fine Arts Center Museum. This museum represents by itself one of Pilsen’s largest 
tourist attractions. Founded in 1982, the museum prides itself in being the largest Mexican 
cultural center and museum in America (Bentacur, 2005).  
Yet, many local residents proclaim that the museum, the trolley rides, and the other 
recent initiatives were not created to the benefit of residents or the community. Tension within 
the community concerning the motives and intentions have been prevalent since the museum’s 
and the other act’s creation (see Bentacur, 2005). For example, to the Executive Director of 
Pilsen Alliance, the free trolley rides and attempts to boost tourism are viewed as a slap in the 
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face to the community by many (see Bentacur, 2005). Thus, these rides continue while night and 
weekend public transportation service for the community was discontinued in 1997. Whereas 
many residents do not have sufficient access to public transportation to get to their places of 
work or shopping, tourists are invited to take a free trolley ride in the very same neighborhood at 
the city’s expense. Despite these claims, the city has pushed ahead, and came to feature Pilsen on 
the official city tourist site. The site descriptively markets the guided tours and free trolley rides 
of Pilsen (see explorechicago.org). 
Figure 12: Mural 1 
 
Source: Photograph taken by the author (May 2010)  
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Figure 13: Mural 2  
 
Source: Photograph taken by the author (May 2010) 
 
 
Figure 14: Protest against gentrification  
 
 
 
Source: Photograph taken by the author (March 2009) 
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In this setting, on January 24, 2006 Alderman Solis, together with three local community 
organizations (The Resurrection Project
25
, the 18th Street Development Corp,
26
  and the Pilsen 
Neighbors Community Council
27
), joined the pro-gentrification Pilsen Planning Committee 
(PPC). Their community redevelopment plan, offered in 2007, became a central plank to make 
Pilsen an “ethnic oriented neighborhood”. Their vision, from the outset, was to forge a 
“prosperous Mexican ethnoscape” (see table 2) that would reflect a civic, stable neighborhood 
and enhance city ethnic diversity. The rhetoric served up the notion of creating an idealized 
ethnic enclave, replete with signs of prosperity and vibrancy that would be a safe and 
entertaining place for all in Chicago to discover. The plan, initially released but still evolving in 
content, will feature five strategic strategies to make the new Pilsen. The central strategy, already 
agreed upon and codified, is to improve Pilsen’s image as a family oriented, authentic Mexican 
neighborhood. According to the PPC, Pilsen must build up its image and embed this in its 
physical fabric to attract customers and visitors. At the center of this would be [to recognize that] 
                                                             
25 Historically, The Resurrection Project (TRP) was an active organization in Pilsen that advocated for the working-
class sectors in Pilsen by promoting affordable housing and contesting gentrification projects. Over the years it has 
progressively transformed into an organization that works together with Alderman Solis in search for funding to 
sustain its endeavors. TRP, together with prominent investors, and help from the city, made a significant impact in 
Pilsen by building affordable housing. Founded by six Catholic parishes in 1990, TRP has catalyzed more than $120 
million in new neighborhood investment. It became the city’s largest producer of New Homes for Chicago, and 
closed 361 mortgages with less than 1 percent defaulted. In 1998 the organization was invited by LISC/Chicago (a 
prominent foundation that is supported by MacArthur Foundation, Lloyd A. Fry Foundation, and Annie E. Casey 
Foundation among other examples) to participate in its pilot New Communities Initiative. In 2000, the LISC New 
Communities Programming in partnership with TRP (they already developed a coalition in the mid 1980s) 
introduced a plan (this time named El Zocalo) to develop the commercial corridors of Pilsen into a “more 
pronounced Mexican cultural attraction” (LISC and TRP, 2000). This project included specialty stores and other 
touristic features. In 2006, under the Quality-of-Life-Plan, the TRP, the LISC, and other institutions elaborated a 
working vision statement that notably communicated a vision of Pilsen: “Build and preserve a stronger, safer, 
healthier, mixed-income Mexican community for families while enhancing the character and history of the 
neighborhood” (working vision statement, Pilsen Retreat Report, 11-22-05). 
26  Eighteenth Street Development Corporation (ESDC) has worked in Pilsen since 1976. This community 
organization is funded by the Chicago Department of Housing and offers assistance on commercial development, 
housing development, historic preservation tax benefits, and industrial development 
(http://www.eighteenthstreet.org/services.html website, retrieved June 9, 2011). 
27
 Pilsen Neighbors Community Council, founded in 1954, works to establish justice and equity policies and 
practices in the Pilsen and Southwest areas (through the areas of education, civil rights of immigrants, and 
transportation). It also works to strengthens religious faith in the community by “investing the development of 
leaders, and pastors through training and action” (http://pilsenneighbors.org/beta/about-us-2?lang=en). 
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“the 18th street business district with its Mexican handicraft shops, groceries, coffee houses and 
bookstore, as a cultural and economic asset that must be protected” (PPC-Quality-of-Life-Plan 
document, 2006).  The elaborate strategy would place in this area a wealth of potent signifiers:  
ethnic banners, kiosks, benches, landscaping, and attractive signage.   
At the same time, the drive to commodify local identities accelerated. Here there was 
growing recognition of Pilsen as inhabited by “ethnic infused beings”. To developers, builders, 
and the city, Pilsen’s residents became more intensely crafted as wearers of an authentic 
ethnicity, incorporating a distinctive ethnic world. Pilsen residents thus became more intensely 
caricatured as ‘authentic’, ‘rooted’, and ‘proud Mexican Americans’ intent on preserving their 
ethnicity. As such, these identities were to be captured in a stylized, symbolic imposition: in 
instilling ethnic restaurants, benevolent push-cart vendors, authentic art galleries and museums, 
ethnically preserved shops, and ritualized street fairs. Making ethnicity visible and open to 
widespread consumption was the core of the matter. As the representative of the Office of 
Tourism puts it “… A true Mexican neighborhood like Pilsen is one part of the total ethnic 
puzzle that makes Chicago a diverse ethnic city ... preserving this ethnicity is the key. It is our 
job to identify [this], capture [this], and sell [this]” (Interview with representative of Office of 
Tourism, in Wilson, 2004).   
At this point, historic preservation became a central instrument of change. In 2006, 
Alderman Solis aggressively spearheaded a drive to designate Pilsen a historic district (from 
Halsted Street and Western Avenue to 16th Street to Cermak Avenue). Here, the program would 
provide property owners within the district with a tax benefit for renovations that would preserve 
the structure’s historic value (Alderman Solis website, 2010). With more than 4,400 residential 
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and commercial structures that qualified for historic preservation, Alderman Solis was avidly 
supported by City Hall and local community groups like The Revitalization Project, the 18th 
Street Development Corp, and the Pilsen Neighbors Community Council (Avila, 2006).  
In the details, the policy would freeze property taxes for eight years for the owner of a 
home, building, condo, or cooperative if the owner lives in the structure. But to qualify for the 
tax break, the owner would have to spend 25 percent of the property's assessed value on 
improvements. This could entail a down payment of $80,000 that most of the homeowners don’t 
qualify for. After eight years, property taxes would rise gradually (Avila, 2006). The other types 
of tax benefits exist for renovating landmark buildings: a federal income tax benefit for large 
buildings and a property tax benefit for commercial building owners (Avila, 2006). Yet, to this 
initiative, Virginia Ordonez, executive director of the Pilsen Alliance, anticipated that few 
homeowners could afford the minimum expenses to qualify for the tax freeze.  
 
Neoliberal redevelopment’s subtly changing rhetoric 
 
“Residents [in Pilsen] don't move out of the neighborhood because of 
gentrification, but because of crime, bad schools, lack of park space, and other 
quality-of-life issues” (Interview with Alderman Solis, in Lutton, 1998). 
 
“We have a good mix of working-class and professional people who are fixing 
up the older buildings, getting involved in the community and putting down roots. 
We've always been a port of entry, but now we are more than that (…)” (in 
Stangenes, 2006). 
  
In the course of the 1990s to late 2005 different initiatives (TIF-Centro 18, Podmajersky’s 
ongoing redevelopment, UIC campus expansion, Chantico Loft condominiums, touristic and 
historic preservation initiatives) have shown that  redevelopment in Pilsen has profoundly 
advanced in a fast pace. But this hasn’t been accomplished without any physical impacts and 
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consequences for Pilsen’s residents. The data gathered from 1990 to 2010 (in Hague and Curran, 
2006; U.S. Census Bureau 2010) showed the dramatic increase in assessed property values, 
property taxes, and rents that have threatened the ability of homeowners to remain in their homes 
and have displaced renters (the majority of the population in Pilsen). Additionally, Pilsen has 
been particularly susceptible to speculative development due to the mismatch between zoning 
and current land use (the RT-4 zoning designation of a large number of single-family homes has 
left these homes vulnerable to condominium conversion, which has further fueled increases in 
real-estate prices). As previously seen, condo conversions are allowed through zoning variances, 
even in the industrial tax increment financing district that was supposed to create industrial 
jobs
28
.  Interviews with several local residents in 2009 and representative of Pilsen Alliance have 
also shown that ethnic retailing and coffee shops have terribly thinned (March 25, 2009). 
Concerns about demographic change were eloquently expressed by one of the owners of a 
famous local restaurant: “‘Low-income families are moving out. You got all these migrant 
families who came from Mexico who can no longer afford to live in Pilsen,’ says Gutierrez, 
sitting in the dining room at Nuevo Leon. ‘On a Friday night, you used to see Mexican families 
in here. Now you see a lot of white American families. Business is business. But you see the 
change.’” (in Boston Globe, March 18, 2007).  
These effects in the physical and social landscape of Pilsen and alderman Solis’ strong desire 
to revitalize the neighborhood showed that Pilsen residents’ fear of displacement and 
gentrification was not unfounded. As discussed, fear of displacement and gentrification 
mobilized this group, further exacerbating tensions in Pilsen. Pilsen’s residents and activists 
                                                             
28
 Analysis of the building inventory data combined with response from community residents has led the Pilsen 
Alliance to advocate for a downzoning of sections of the neighborhood from RT4 to RS3. The data has also shown 
that a large number of homeowners are not claiming the homeowner exemption on their property taxes (Hague and 
Curran, 2006). 
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defended their roots, cultural heritage, and sources of labor as they have done ever since the 
Chicago 21 Plan in the mid-1970s (Bentacur, 2005).  
This resistance, sporadic, but periodically substantial, has shaped local redevelopment 
dynamics. To date, gentrification has not been thwarted, but the struggle, as discussions with 
local developers, the real-estate community, and the city revealed, have poignantly reverberated 
through the community’s consciousness. Redevelopment to move forward hasn’t been an easy 
task. Early on, Alderman Solis expressed to the Chicago Reader that “…every development 
project in Pilsen has been questioned, and not only questioned, but there have been allegations 
that it's part of a conspiracy to ethnically cleanse the area or to gentrify the area. That includes 
a streetscaping project along 18th Street, the UIC expansion, and an industrial TIF that I'm 
proposing for the neighborhood” (in Lutton, 1998). Prominent developer Podmajersky also 
noted that today Pilsen is known as “the explosive neighborhood where angry Latinos meet 
attempts to upgrade” (Interview with developer J. Podmajersky, in Wison and Sternberg, 2012). 
Moreover, residents’ mission, to this developer, “is to thwart upgrading at every turn”. Similar 
themes were expressed by the representative of Lipe Properties Company: “Many private 
developers have been scared away by activism and controversy in the area” (Interview, June 18, 
2010).   
Yet, neoliberal redevelopment governance helped rationalize the benefits of redevelopment 
as well as adroitly overcome contestation in most cases. As seen, from 1996 to 2005, developers, 
builders, and the city became omniscient narrators and central figures who managed and directed 
redevelopment as they see fit in Pilsen. 
It is important to note that this powerful, pro-gentrification rhetoric now chronicled subtly 
began to change in 2006. A growing feeling of turbulent economic times has contributed to a 
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pervasive sense of doubt about Chicago’s redevelopment future. As one developer I talked to put 
it: “ … I am now not so sure about the carrying capacity of the city to absorb new building … I 
have hopes … but times have changed … it’s unclear what the future will bring” (Interview, 
August 7, 2009). The national and local economic slow-down, the city’s growing debt ($420 
million in 2009, see Huffington Post, 2008), and proliferating mortgage foreclosures have 
become illuminating symbols to him and others. This sensibility now affects builders and 
developers that do business in Pilsen and across Chicago. In some cases, some projects, such as 
Centro 18 that were inaugurated with much enthusiasm, were discontinued.     
In this context, the real-estate community now strives to be more adroit, astute, and engaging 
in Pilsen. Sense of difficult times has led to a refinement of interactive strategies and policies. 
This new real-estate strategy is consistent with The Revitalization Project (TRP)’s initiative (now 
characterized as a pro-gentrification actor). Since 2006, in times of economic constraints and less 
investment in the neighborhood, the TRP started to incorporate other market dimensions into its 
agenda. The idea of developing condos and town houses for the more affluent was not unpopular 
for TRP if they saved 21 percent for the mixed-income houses. As Kerry Smith pointed out, “we 
[TRP] had to sit and negotiate, instead of opposing the construction of these endeavors like other 
[organizations] have been doing [referring to Pilsen Alliance]” (Interview, August 7, 2009).  A 
similar sensitive strategy, and successful one was conducted by Lipe Properties. Anticipating 
active contestation, Lipe Properties decided to set aside 21% of the Chantico Loft units for 
mixed-income houses (Chicago Tribune, April 22, 2005).     
In line with the perceived harsh economic times, pronouncements about Pilsen and its 
social fabric also subtly changed. This place and population continues to be cast as culturally 
afflicted, decimated, and pathologically driven, i.e., as “disorderly” and “crime ridden” (Wilson 
75 
 
et al., 2004; Wilson and Grammenos, 2005). Yet, this ‘revanchist’ rhetoric (Smith, 1996) has 
begun to soften, in anticipation that it would be decreasingly successful. New city economic 
realities, increased impoverishment and hunger, unemployment, increasing protests, and an 
eclipsing city hungry to maintain its already dropping revenues have created an atmosphere and 
the need to subtly shift the redevelopment rhetoric (Wison and Sternberg, 2012). Thus, one 
developer noted to me: “hey, we need to see the poverty and problems in Pilsen … there are 
many struggling here in Pilsen … it’s hard times ..” (Interview August 7, 2009). Moreover, a 
realtor noted to me that “Central Pilsen is tough, it’s still populated by the misguided poor ...but 
many are in tough times, it’s a tough world now here and elsewhere ..” (Interview August 7, 
2009). As final evidence of this shift,  Alderman Solis expressed the new character of the 
Pilseneros as hard workers, professionals, and rooted and forever proud Mexican Americans: 
“We have a good mix of working-class and professional people who are fixing up the older 
buildings, getting involved in the community and putting down roots. We've always been a port 
of entry, but now we are more than that (…)” (Chicago Tribune, February 18, 2006). Now, 
revanchist sentiments were being tempered by an offering of more humanism (see table 2). A 
sense of starkly grim economic times, city economic malaise, a stalled real-estate sector, and 
discordant residents tired of poverty has induced this response.    
Currently, on the one hand, housing affordability in some areas of Pilsen continues to attract 
new incomers while also offering a choice to old residents to stay and attracting low-income 
households from elsewhere in the city. On the other hand, long-term disinvestment in the 
housing stock and speculation appears to be driving up housing values throughout the 
neighborhood but particularly to the east (Interview with Professor of Geography in Chicago, 
March 25, 2010). Additionally, the city continues to engage in an intense process of promotion 
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of Pilsen’s unique Mexican culture. Condominium conversions (Figure 15) are slowly but still 
moving into east Pilsen; the media and multiple web pages are promoting the area as a place to 
visit and live in; specific sites have been proposed for zoning changes and middle income 
developments. In short, although the upgrading and gentrification process has slowed down 
compared to 2003-2006, the area is still cultivated and promoted as “an ethnic enclave” and a 
leading edge for redevelopment.   
TABLE 3: REDEVELOPMENT PROJECTS EXAMINED THROUGH 4 DIMENSIONS OF  
ANALYSIS. 
 
Spatial Project “Ravaged-depressed space” that can become a  “potentially 
prosperous ethnoscape” 
Cultural project                People to be understood as “ethnic-infused beings” 
Neighborhood to be understood as a contributor to the 
city’s economic aspiration (go-global project)  
Process-based project  A shifting less punitive rhetoric  towards the Latino 
population 
Historically and geographically 
constituted project  
A (Pilsen-and Chicago) specific redevelopment rhetoric and 
practices are offered 
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 Figure 15: Recent developments in Pilsen 
 
Source: Photograph taken by the author (May 2010) 
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Argentina’s neoliberal governance ascendancy and 2001 crisis  
 
Between 1989 and 1999, Argentina introduced a series of structural economic changes that 
came to constitute its neoliberal core.  Following the Washington consensus protocol, two main 
laws were approved by the Congress: Reform of the State (August 1989) and the Economic 
Emergency Act (September 1989). These two laws provided the legal framework for the 
subsequent economic policies: privatization of practically all public enterprises (i.e., 
telecommunications, gas, electricity, water, transport, iron, and steel); implementation of free 
movement of capital; reduction on import tariffs; and re-negotiation of the external debt to 
arrange payments (Lo Vuolo, 1997). Following this, in 1991 the Convertibility Law was enacted. 
This law meant the deregulation of the economy and the reduction of the federal government 
from 347,000 to 200,000 jobs (Acuña, 2002: 46); the reduction of the foreign debt; the 
liberalization of trade; the flexibilization of the labor market; the reduction of labor costs; and the 
privatization of the retirement system.  
This package of policies considerably increased Argentine foreign trade. However, the 
opening of the markets and the overvalued local currency had an important impact on the 
imports and exports balance. The stronger impact was on the local industry and budget. As an 
immediate result of the reduction of tariffs and the opening of the market, imported 
manufactured goods flooded the domestic market (especially textile, car, paper, and food 
products). In the process, the national labor market experienced several changes: a growth in the 
informal sector of the economy, a decrease of full-time jobs, an increase in service jobs, and a 
reduction of manufacturing industry jobs (Lo Vuolo, 1997; Beccaria and Lopez, 1997).  For only 
a few years (1991-1994), the national economy decreased its inflation rates and began to grow, 
mainly as a result of short-term investments and the foreign capital influx that was injected into 
the privatized companies. Yet, the social consequences of these economic reforms were 
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tremendous. Despite the economic growth, the unemployment rate quickly increased from 5.2% 
in 1991 to 12.2% in 1994, followed by 18% in 1998.  
 After eight years of this aggressive neoliberalism which came to be known as “savage 
capitalism” (Klein, 2007) the national economy deteriorated leading to a national crisis. To note, 
privatization decimated the middle class: more than 40 percent lost their white-collar jobs and 
the bulk of their safety net (i.e., clientelist networks). The virulence of the outrage of 2001, as we 
will see below, was fueled in part by the perception that the middle class, accustomed  to a solid 
materialist existence,  experienced a decimation of these once realities (North, 2007).  
In 1999, after ten years of President Menem’s administration, De la Rua, former mayor of 
Buenos Aires, was elected President. He took office with a critical federal fiscal deficit, 
escalating unemployment, a huge reduction of international investments, and growing 
international debt. In response, the Convertibility Law was eliminated and the national currency 
was devalued, which led to a slow recovery in the production of national assets.  
But in 2001, as a result of significantly unpopular policies and a critical economic and 
political-institutional situation, President De La Rua was forced to resign. Over three days in 
December 2001, a mass demonstration composed of seniors on pensions and unemployed and 
underemployed people converged on the Plaza de Mayo in central Buenos Aires, banging pots 
and pans, and letting off fireworks. The immediate cause of their anger was an aborted attempt 
by the state to raid private pension funds to pay an installment due on Argentina’s foreign debt 
(North, 2007). This undermined investors’ confidence and money quickly flowed out of the 
country into offshore accounts in U.S. currency. Citizens still talk of lines of armored cars on 
their way to the airport and to the ferry to Uruguay. The state then attempted to counter this 
monetary exodus by freezing bank accounts, but it was too late. A monthly drawings limit of 350 
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pesos was imposed, known as the “corralito” or “playpen”. Furious savers vented their anger at 
the inability to withdraw their money. They were quickly joined by thousands of unemployed 
and underemployed people, who were unhappy with their treatment by the regime.  Buenos Aires 
exploded into near insurrection. An attempt to declare a state of emergency was the final straw: 
in what became known as the “Argentinazo”; President de La Rua was forced to resign and flee 
the presidential palace in a helicopter. Three other presidents came and went in quick succession 
before the Peronist Eduardo Duhalde became interim president.  
During the early months of 2002 the economy nose-dived. Rock (2002) reported that the 
Argentine gross domestic product (GDP) sank by 16.3 percent during this period, while 
manufacturing output plunged 20 percent. One in five Argentinians now lived in severe poverty, 
which in the provinces meant hunger and struggles to obtain decent housing (North, 2007). 
Twenty percent were unemployed, while an additional 23 percent were underemployed.  
In April 2003 President Nestor Kirchner was popularly elected. A two-year period of 
economic and social stability followed by three consecutive years of steady economic 
reactivation through an export boom on the back of a newly competitive peso showed that 
Argentina was slowly recovering from the 2001 crisis. The economy grew at a steady 8.8 percent 
in 2003 and 2004, but 40 percent of Argentines still lived below the poverty line, with 15 percent 
still in extreme poverty (Buenos Aires Herald, 2005).  
 
Impacts of neoliberal policies on Buenos Aires’ real-estate market 
  
The social and economic impacts of the neoliberal federal policies introduced in the early 
1990s cut through Argentina’s capital city, Buenos Aires. First, with markets opened to foreign 
goods and capital investments, foreign investment into the city’s built environment accelerated.  
Thus, shortly thereafter, IRSA, one of George Soros’ multinational real-estate companies, 
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became one of the principal real-estate investors in Buenos Aires, followed by Macri, 
Consultatio Groups, and local investors and developers (Jacquelin, 1997; Brea, 1998). Most 
affected was the Catalinas Norte and Puerto Madero areas, which experienced a dramatic burst 
of businesses, financial establishments, service industries, international hotels, shopping centers, 
upscale restaurants, and boutiques (see Jacquelin, 1997; Brea, 1998; Crot, 2006).  
Amidst this real-estate boom in downtown Buenos Aires, spatial segregation intensified 
during the 1990s
29
.  Thus, an analysis of the residential construction market between 1980 and 
1999 shows a major increase in residential polarization. At the same time, there was a major 
growth in luxury homes as gentrified enclaves sprung up across downtown Buenos Aires. Thus,  
a study of socio-residential changes in the city in the last two decades of the 20th century reveals 
that “housing construction has been increasingly directed towards high-income groups” (Plan 
Urbano Ambiental, 2000: 11)
30
.  
                                                             
29 In Buenos Aires and its metropolitan area of 13 million people, the social consequences of these policies can be 
also viewed through the rate of urban unemployment and employees without social benefits. During the 1990s a 
large number of workers were excluded from the job market. Between 1991 and 2001, the unemployment rate 
increased to 26.7%, with an outlying 20.2% unemployment rate in 1995 (Ministerio de Trabajo y Unidad Social, 
1995). For employees with benefits, from 1980 to 2001 the number of employees with some social benefits 
decreased by 11.3%. This situation was even worse for workers that had no benefits; from 1980 to 2001 that rate 
went from 12% to 35.8%. The deterioration of the labor market had a major effect on the wealth distribution and 
increasing levels of inequality that exploded as a result of the 2001 crisis. In Buenos Aires, the increases in 
inequality can be seen through the changes in the Gini coefficient, which went from 0.411 in 1980 to 0.437 in 1990 
to 0.446 in 1997 (Altimir & Beccaria, 2001). In addition, to the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares of the INDEC 
(Permanent Household Survey) taken from August 1998 to August 1999, 90% of the 13 million people living in the 
Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area experienced a reduction in their income by almost 10 percent, while the richest 10 
percent achieved an increase of 5 percent (Clarín Digital, 3-11-99). The survey also estimated that the richest 20 
percent of the population of the BAMA took 55.2 percent of total income while the poorest 20 percent took only 3.9 
percent (Clarín Digital, 3-11-99). Thus, the richest segment of the population took 14 times more than the poorest. 
As Grimson and Cerruti note (2007) high levels of inequality were caused by the high levels of unemployment in the 
BAMA, as well as by the growth of families already resident in the ‘villas miseria’ (shanty towns). 
30 In addition, the average surface per new residence indicates that applications for—and approval of—construction 
permits have been predominantly aimed at the provision of large units. This clearly points toward a reduction in the 
provision of cheap residential solutions. It also denotes a marked distinction between the 1980s and the 1990s: when 
comparing between two nine-year periods, from 1982 to 1990 and from 1991 to 1999, the numbers show that during 
the second period the total provision of new residential units rose by 377% and the total provision of newly built 
square meters increased by 253% (Crot, 2006). 
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Yet, in the late 1990s the real-estate boom slowed down after the Convertibility Plan showed 
signs of exhaustion. And as a consequence of the national economic shortfall, from 2001 to early 
2003, the real-estate market in Buenos Aires experienced a roll back (CEDEM, 2006). In 2002, 
during the first months of the national currency devaluation, the local real-estate sector not only 
suffered the impact of the general crisis and the dilemma of reduced consumption, but also, the 
impact of the currency devaluation, which drastically dropped property and land prices. The 
recession persisted until early 2003. However, in 2003 an interesting economic phenomenon 
occurred. In that year, the main source of capital injection for the real-estate market was the 
funds ‘saved’ by citizens as a consequence of the corralito (playpen) policy and from the savings 
accumulated by the financial system. As previously discussed, the corralito was the freezing of 
citizen’s bank deposits in late 2001. As a result of capital fleeing overseas and the absence of a 
back-up for the bank deposits in foreign currency, the withdrawal of money from the bank 
accounts was strictly limited (only $250 pesos a month) and the larger deposits were confiscated 
by the state. Additionally, after the national currency devaluation, the deposits were converted 
into pesos using some arbitrary indexes. As the U.S. dollar quickly incremented its value, many 
bank clients appealed to the department of justice and wanted to claim their deposits in dollar 
currency. An alternative to quickly recovering these assets, since the money couldn’t be 
withdrawn, was to “jump over” the corralito, (i.e., invest in the real-estate market). In the 
process, between 2003 and 2004 the market was fueled by middle-income investors, who bought 
properties to jump over the corralito but also took advantage of the low property prices. To the 
Centro de Estudios Demograficos Metropolitanos (Center for the Study of Metropolitan 
Demographics- CEDEM), these actors were the ones who then sustained the real-estate boom 
during 2003-2005 (CEDEM, 2005), especially in San Telmo as we will be discussing later.  
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In sum, after the currency devaluation in December 2001, a segmentation of the real-estate 
market became more pronounced in Buenos Aires.  On the one hand, there was a new demand 
for higher price housing. On the other hand, 7.1 percent of the households (212,289 people) still 
had basic materialist needs unsatisfied
31
 (Census 2001). In the southern area of Buenos Aires, in 
particular, the middle-and high-income sectors were the ones that invested in new properties 
after the economic crisis, more discussion about this will follow (Herzer, 2008). The following 
section will focus on narrating the redevelopment governance in the south area (La Boca and San 
Telmo), its operations, institutions, and outcomes. 
 
Buenos Aires’ neoliberal redevelopment governance 
 
Buenos Aires’ neoliberal redevelopment governance32 became sanctioned with the new 
autonomous political status
33
 in 1996. Once the city was granted political autonomy with its own 
constitution, own budget, and with democratically elected executive and legislative powers, it 
established the normative regulations and institutions (see later section) to advance 
                                                             
31
 This index has been recommended by the CEPAL (Economic Commission for Latin America) since the 1980s as 
a way of measuring poverty. It comprises type of housing, access to sanitary services, level of instruction, and 
household income.  
32
 We will consider this period – from the early 1990s to 1998 - as the first phase of neoliberalism characterized by a 
predominant influx of global real-estate capital. However, for the purpose of this study we will focus on the second 
phase of neoliberalism - from 1998 to the present - whereby neoliberal redevelopment governance dramatically 
advanced as it became consolidated. It is also necessary to note that in the early period, global capital investment 
and the federal government were the principal forces that physically transformed downtown Buenos Aires, 
particularly Puerto Madero (Madero Port). However, since the nature, institutions and impacts of this redevelopment 
project were significantly different from the one that will be narrated for the south area, we will not describe the 
redevelopment project of Puerto Madero. Very briefly, the Puerto Madero consisted of an urban renewal project in 
the old port of Buenos Aires that cost the global capital and federal and local government $2.5 billion. Interestingly, 
Puerto Madero had been an abandoned port district of warehouses, silos, factories, mills, and customs houses on the 
waterfront of the Río de la Plata until the early 1990s, when a joint venture of local, federal government, and global 
capital development sought to transform the area into a live/work and entertainment complex, replete with lofts, 
offices, hotels, theaters, restaurants, and cafés. This initiative basically didn’t have a major impact on the 
displacement of population as the redevelopment was executed in a desolated area.   
33 Within the previous city’s political regime, the mayor was appointed by the President of Argentina. After the 
reform of the national constitution in 1994 and the dictate of a local new constitution in 1996, the citizens of Buenos 
Aires could elect its mayor and representatives of the Legislative Chamber.  
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redevelopment projects. With the deregulation of the real-estate market and favorable real-estate 
market prices compared to other markets in Latin America and abroad, this governance was 
primed to now push to build an affluent, real-estate profitable city that would also be livable for 
its citizens.  
At the core of this
34
, the neoliberal redevelopment agenda has strived to promote Buenos 
Aires as a culturally and socially integrated city. In general terms, the Buenos Aires’ cultural and 
integrated city initiative has focused on expanding aesthetic and cultural consumption policies 
and upgrading disinvested areas that would ultimately attract local and foreign real-estate capital 
investment and socially integrate communities (La Nación, February 27, 2000).  
This ongoing neoliberal governance has relied on the following institutions (see table 4): 
local government, prominent local real-estate capital, prominent local developers, builders and 
financial institutions, and especially professional corporations, public-private civic corporations, 
and academic institutions.  Although as auxiliary players, the Argentine Chamber of 
Construction and the media have been actively shaping planning agendas (Interview with city 
planner, in La Nación, March 14, 2005). By 1998, this coalition had worked together to 
predominantly promote cultural and aesthetic consumption initiatives (e.g., promoting cultural 
and historical preservation initiatives, expanding museums, art galleries, restoring façades, etc.) 
and to upgrade some areas of the city considered ‘relegated’ and ‘disinvested’ (Crot, 2006).  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
34 Successive elected administrations: De La Rua , Olivera, Ibarra, Ibarra, Telerman, Macri, and currently Macri. De 
La Rua, former Federal Senator, became the first elected mayor of Buenos Aires following elections on June 30, 
1996. He resigned in 1999 to become President of Argentina and was forced to resign in December 2001.  
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TABLE 4: NEOLIBERAL REDEVELOPMENT GOVERNANCE IN BUENOS AIRES  
Population Size  2,891,082 (Census 2010) 
Institutional Composition Local government  
Prominent local real-estate capital, developers, builders and 
financial institutions 
Professional corporations  
Public-private civic corporations 
Academic institutions 
Homeowners and artisans 
Auxiliary players: Chambers of Construction, the Media.  
Dominant Rhetoric Used  Culturally-driven and socially integrated city 
“We believe that culture contributes to the progress of the city and 
this cannot be delayed” (Buenos Aires government official, 2000) 
“Culture will [socially] integrate all the areas that are now being 
dispersed” (Architect Roberto Converti and ex government official, in 
La Nación, February 27, 2000)” 
 
 
 
87 
 
 To this end, this coalition has systematically deployed public resources: physical 
infrastructure, zoning incentives, public land, and tax incentives to help create demand for the 
real-estate community and more affluent populations’ investment. Equally important has been 
the clearing out of land for potential restructuring. For this purpose, eviction and displacement of 
families living in abandoned buildings and conventillos
35
 (tenements) have acutely manifested 
since 2003 as I will discuss later.  
 Accompanying the redevelopment has been an aggressive rhetoric: the need to cultivate a 
“culturally-driven and socially integrated city”36. Now neoliberal redevelopment governance 
embraced ‘culture’ as a monolithic principle that could enable the social integration of the 
working class communities of the south with the more affluent ones of the north, drive 
redevelopment, and facilitate  economic growth (Lacarrieu, 2005). A former government official 
summed this thematic up:  
“…we believe that culture contributes to the social and 
economic development and this cannot be delayed. [In addition], 
the local government aspires to balance the north of the city with 
the more deteriorated areas [of the south]… We want to diminish 
the structural unevenness of the city” (in Arenes, 2000).  
  
                                                             
35 The history of the conventillos dated back to the European immigration. Between 1869 and 1904, the Buenos 
Aires population quintupled and surpassed the housing capacity. It was then when the casas de inquilinato o 
conventillos became a good alternative to host the hordes of immigrants: there were houses with many rooms, all of 
them facing a common-use patio. The families will pay a rent and share the restrooms and the kitchen. It is 
estimated that around 500 conventillos remain in La Boca (Clarín, February 27, 2004).  
36 I argue that this vision was drawn on the concept of progress anchored by the ‘Generation 1880s’, an elite who 
governed Argentina from 1880 to 1916 that followed and cultivated the positivist principle of ‘progress’. In this 
period, this group of government officials and intellectuals elaborated main principles to build the ideal Argentine 
nation. This Generation believed - and it developed thorough different sociopolitical periods - in a nation as a 
progressive-oriented entity linked to three core values: culture, development, and social integration (Lacarrieu, 
2005: 392). This elite also believed that the city of Buenos Aires was the exemplar community where the project of 
a progressive nation was to be consolidated and cultivated (Lacarrieu, 2005) and, at that time, to this elite, Buenos 
Aires had embraced these key core values. In this context, this vision of the city of Buenos Aires, as a city of 
culture, development, and social integration, has been embedded in the social imaginary and has historically been 
embraced by the citizen’s culture (Gorelik, in Lacarrieu, 2005) 
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But while cultural policies and programs were flourishing, they generated impacts that 
escalated over the years. By 2003, the city’s neoliberal redevelopment governance had created an 
increasingly class-segregated city
37
. In the housing realm, reduction of the public housing budget 
(for example, the Instituto de Vivienda de la Ciudad reduced its budget by 50 percent from 2006 
to 2011) was inversely proportional to the rate of construction of housing for middle- and upper-
income sectors (see Furlong and Torres, 2000).  This public housing reduction helps explain why 
an unprecedented 20 percent of the population (600,000 inhabitants) registered deficient housing 
conditions in the city in 2010. Within these numbers, 100,000 live in abandoned buildings 
(Census, 2010). In response to this housing affordability crisis, local government initiated a 
number of programs (i.e. affordable housing, rebuilding and refurbishing of conventillos) that 
ultimately resulted in low levels of execution (see Rodriguez et al., 2008).  
By 2003, redevelopment actions continued to proceed aggressively ahead. Yet, the 
redevelopment rhetoric changed in response to evolving social, political, and economic 
conditions in Buenos Aires. This revisionist rhetoric took a decidedly “revanchist” turn, offering 
more punishing and afflicting conceptions of people (the poor), places (poor neighborhoods), and 
processes (poverty).  The rhetoric, now, renders squatters as “undesirable”’ and “plagues” in the 
city landscape. Constructions of the ocupas (slang for squatters) are widely portrayed as 
pathological analytic objects that need to be reformed or displaced to other localities. The result: 
this revanchist rhetoric (Smith, 1996) helped rationalize growing displacement across the city. 
One case, in the city’s south area, is notable for the controversy it provoked:  the displacement of 
187 families and the eviction of 14 families from an abandoned building, ex-orphanage named 
“PADELAI” (discussed in detail in the next chapter). Today, this governance continues to 
                                                             
37 From 1998 to 2006, the income gap between the richest 10 percent and the poorest 10 percent was 126 wider and 
increased by 17 percent (Rodriguez,et al., 2008). 
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aggressively pursue a “culturally-driven and socially integrated” city restructuring. The physical 
and social transformation of the south area continues to proceed ahead, now extending it to La 
Boca and San Telmo (Interview with Professor of Sociology, January 4, 2010).  
The following chapter examines the most significant redevelopment initiatives that have 
changed the physical and social character of La Boca and San Telmo. Neoliberal redevelopment 
governance’s crafted rhetoric, freely using metaphors, imagined spaces, and sanitary codings will 
be discussed in my analysis.   
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Neoliberal redevelopment governance in La Boca and San Telmo    
 
 
La Boca, together with San Telmo (Figure 16), is one of the oldest areas in Buenos Aires. It 
retains a strong European flavor dated from the late 19
th
 century when its early settlers arrived 
from the Italian city of Genoa. These early Italian settlers worked in the warehouses and meat-
packing plants. Around 6 million foreign immigrants poured into Argentina between the years 
1880 and 1930, in which time Buenos Aires quickly turned from a small town to a growing city. 
La Boca became a working-class district and residents lived largely in small homes made of 
wood and metal sheets. These houses were typically built on stilts because of constant floods; 
they were painted with the leftovers from the painting of ships (Figure 17). From 1930 to 1970, 
La Boca became a site for meat-packing industries. Shortly thereafter, it experienced a sustained 
de-industrialization (see Gutman and Hardoy, 2005). Its industrial base was largely dismantled 
during the introduction of neoliberal policies in the late 1990s (Lo Vuolo, 1997; CEDEM, 2006). 
Through the mid-1990s, the neighborhood fell into a downward spiral of decline and 
disinvestment.  
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Figure 16: Buenos Aires neighborhoods  
 
 
  
Source: Direccion General de Estadistica y Censo, Ministerio de Hacienda, Gobierno de la Ciudad de 
Buenos Aires (2011) 
 
 
 
San Telmo  
La Boca 
Telmo 
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With a population of 46,494 (Census 2010), La Boca is currently a working-class 
neighborhood and an artist colony with nearly 30 percent of residents officially unemployed. 
Most of the residents are renters (60%), followed by homeowners (28%), and the rest (22%) live 
in precarious, if not illegal, tenancy situations (Herzer et al., 2008). About 23.7 percent of the 
households has basic unsatisfied needs (NBI
38
), and housing is concentrated in significantly 
degraded conditions, such us conventillos (tenements) where the access to sanitary services is 
shared by various families and the housing is often structural unsound (Census 2001). The 
conventillos represent 17.6 percent of existing housing in La Boca, while 15.8 percent of the 
entire population resides in houses, and the rest live in apartments (63.7 %) (Herzer et al., 2008).   
In this context, the terms “picturesque” and “bohemian” have historically been associated 
with La Boca for its concentration of artistic features, performances, and prominent streets like 
“Caminito” and “Vuelta de Rocha” (figures 18). These streets are touristic enclaves par 
excellence for its multi-colored houses, artists, and daily performances of tango. Yet, the flip side 
of this touristic La Boca, until 1996, has been its constant floods (Figure 19a). The neighborhood 
was built on the riverbanks of the “Riachuelo” river (Figure 19b), a lowland area affected by 
seasonal Southeast winds
39
, and as a result, it has been plagued with flooding for over 100 years. 
Currently, La Boca does not suffer from these recurrent natural events. But overcrowded 
conventillos dating from the 19
th
 century, heavy traffic, and disinvestment are its physical 
features that discourage investment in its housing.   
                                                             
38
 As previously mentioned, this is an index that measures poverty composed by type of household, income, and 
access to food.  
39
 The phenomenon Sudestada consists of a sudden rotation of cold southern winds to the south-east. This change, 
while moderating the cold temperatures, loads the air masses with oceanic humidity, bringing heavy rain and rough 
seas in the coastal regions. The air circulation also increases the intensity of the winds. The Sudestada is most likely 
to happen in late fall and winter. 
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Yet, in the last decade, this neighborhood has changed.  It started in 1996 while hydraulic 
and sanitation works were executed along the riverfront of the Riachuelo to control local 
flooding (to note, floods have been prevented, yet not controlled, with patch-aid solutions 
implemented by the previous local administrations). Additionally, La Boca has a history of 
activism associated with its conventillos. People lived in conventillos since the late 19
th
 century 
until the military government (from 1976 to 1982) executed different plans to eradicate them. 
With the return to democracy in 1982, four attempts to rebuild them into affordable housing led 
by the local government have scared away the local dwellers through fears of displacement. In 
response to these redevelopment attempts (in 1983, 1984, 1988, and 1990), two prominent 
neighborhood associations, Desalojados de la Boca (Displaced of La Boca) and Asociación 
Vecinos de La Boca (La Boca Neighbors Association), have exercised activism to maintain these 
tenements (see Grillo, 1988; Suarez 1993; Lacarrieu, 1995). Yet, pressure to revamp these 
buildings continued when the Riachuelo riverfront renovations resumed in 1996 and later in 
2009.   
Figure 17: La Boca (multi-colored houses)  
 
Source: Photograph taken by the author (January 2010) 
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Figure 18: Caminito Street  
  
Source: Photograph taken by the author (June 2010) 
  
Figure 19a: Floods in La Boca. Photograph from 1985. 
  
Source: www.noticiasdebomberos.com (retrieved June 2010) 
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Figure 19b: Vuelta de Rocha (riverwalk)-Riachuelo River 
 
Source: Google images on La Boca, anonymous (retrieved June 2010) 
 
Similarly, San Telmo is a central tourist neighborhood in Buenos Aires. It has 
comparatively better living conditions than La Boca with 80.5 percent of the population 
employed and 79.3 percent living in well-serviced houses. These numbers contrast with 15.8 
percent of the population living with basic unsatisfied needs (NBI) and 5.8 percent living in 
conventillos (Herzer, 2008). The barrio is charged with a historical symbolism: It maintains 
traditions of ferias, antiquaries, art-galleries, and tango-related activities (Figure20). The 
“adoquines” (cobblestones) streets (Figure21) are often filled with artists, dancers, and street 
performers during the weekends.  
San Telmo is the neighborhood in closer proximity to downtown Buenos Aires. With a 
population of 25,969 (Census 2010), it has historically been a blue-collar working neighborhood 
that has slowly evolved as  a middle-upper class neighborhood with flourishing trendy 
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restaurants, antiquaries, coffee shops, and retail stores. In San Telmo, 59.6 percent of the 
population are homeowners while 28.9 percent rent (Di Virgilio, 2008), the remaining population 
lives in different tenancy situations: renting or occupying rooms in conventillos, living in slums, 
and/or occupying private and public buildings.  
Besides its tourist oriented areas, San Telmo is also widely known for its orphanage 
center, the PADELAI, built in 1904, now closed but currently being converted into a cultural 
center. This orphanage operated until 1970, and it remained abandoned until 1984 when it 
became occupied by homeless families. Since then, sporadic but intense pronouncements by the 
media and real-estate community have vilified the building and its residents. Yet, pathological 
renditions of the squatters escalated and became acute in 2003 when the local government and 
homeowners pushed to evict the ocupas’ and stopped until it was closed in 2005, (more details 
will be provided in later sections about this phenomenon). Unlike La Boca, this neighborhood 
does not have a predominant history of activism, and the closure and eviction of the PADELAI’s 
residents were widely supported by local residents, which will be further discussed.  
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Figure 20: San Telmo Ferias  
 
Source: Photograph taken by the author (January 2010) 
Figure 21: San Telmo, cobblestone streets and colonial houses 
 
Source: Photograph taken by the author (January 2010) 
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In 1996, La Boca and San Telmo faced pressures for urban expansion and gentrification led 
by an alliance built by local governmental institutions
40
, prominent local real-estate capital 
(Giesso and LG Ramos), prominent developers, builders and financial institutions (Argencons, 
Dypsa, Fundación Brocca, City of Buenos Aires Bank, and InterAmerican Development Bank), 
professional corporations (Society of Architects, Society of Engineers), public-private civic 
corporations (Corporation South Buenos Aires), and academic institutions (Faculty of 
Architecture, Planning and Design, University of Buenos Aires) (Rodriguez, et al., 2008), (see  
table 5). The Argentine Chamber of Construction and the media have been participating as 
auxiliary players and yet actively shape planning agendas (in Crot, 2006). Local homeowners in 
San Telmo, and prominent artisans in La Boca, became significant actors in the post-crisis 
redevelopment, which will be discussed in later sections. Each of these institutions has pushed to 
transform the physical and social landscape in the south as means to attract investment and 
middle-income consumers. Such physical transformation included renewal of physical 
infrastructure (riverfront and highways); restoration of promenades, buildings, art galleries, and 
historical buildings; and expansion of commercial and residential corridors with hotels, hostels, 
antiquaries, retail stores, and restaurants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
40 Predominantly, Urban Planning Department, Secretary of Culture, Secretary of Infrastructure 
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TABLE 5: NEOLIBERAL REDEVELOPMENT GOVERNANCE IN LA BOCA AND SAN 
TELMO 
 
Institutional composition Local government: Urban Planning Department, Secretary of Culture, 
Secretary of Infrastructure 
Local real-estate capital: Giesso and L.G. Ramos Realty 
Developers, builders and financial institutions: Dypsa, Fundación 
Rocca, City of Buenos Aires Bank, InterAmerican Development Bank. 
In the post-crisis period: local homeowners in San Telmo and 
artisans in La Boca  
Professional corporations: Society of Architects, Society of Engineers 
Public-private civic corporations: Corporation South Buenos Aires 
Academic institutions: Faculty of Architecture, Planning and Design, 
University of Buenos Aires  
Auxiliary players: Media (La Nación, Clarín, Pagina 12), Argentine 
Chamber of Construction 
Dominant rhetoric used  La Boca and San Telmo are “cultural poles of attractions” to serve the 
purposes of the city’s “cultural and integrated city” initiative.  
 
 
The principal economic forces of redevelopment described earlier (deregulation of the 
economy and globally competitive property prices) and positive urban features for both 
neighborhoods (having lower rents and property prices compared to the rest of the city, 
proximate to the downtown and central areas of the city, and considerable proportion of renters - 
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28.9% in San Telmo and 60% in La Boca) proved to be incredible incentives for speculative 
real-estate capital and developers in the late 1990s (Smith, 1996; CEDEM, 2006). Some of these 
favorable urban features were noted by a local prominent real-estate agent: “La Boca and San 
Telmo have traditionally been working class neighborhoods and the prices of the rent and 
properties have been comparatively lower than the rest of the city” (Interview, December 19, 
2009).  
But in contrast to these positive urban features, the poor quality infrastructure and services 
provided in the south area constituted critical limitations to advance large-scale redevelopment 
projects. In this context, the local government took a highly active role (Harvey, 1989) in 
providing the material and legal conditions for developers and the real-estate community to help 
upscale La Boca and San Telmo. This meant investing in building critical infrastructure, creating 
public-private corporations, and flexibilizing zoning ordinances. All of these constituted public 
tools and incentives to unleash the land market from supposedly previous ‘rigid’ regulatory 
schemes that neoliberal actors pushed to reform. All of this will be further discussed in the next 
sections.  
Notably, most of these redevelopment initiatives did not face active resistance. After years of 
physical disinvestment, the initiatives to revitalize the south area became celebrated, not 
contested, by sections of the media, government officials, and residents in both neighborhoods 
(Herzer et al., 2008). Nevertheless, contestation has been triggered by attempts to renovate 
conventillos (La Boca) and to evict the squatters in the PADELAI (San Telmo). This will be 
narrated in the following sections.  
What follows is a narrative of the main redevelopment initiatives that have changed the 
physical and social fabric of this south area in Buenos Aires. As we see, a thick rhetoric was 
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critical here. The crafted rhetoric of the neoliberal redevelopment governance, which freely used 
metaphors, imaginary spaces, and sanitary codings, have “back-boned” these efforts.  In 
particular, they have helped rationalize the supposed virtues and benefits of the development 
projects to the general public.  
 
Principal redevelopment initiatives in La Boca and San Telmo  
 
Normative and institutional transformations: Urban Environmental Plan (UEP), Urban 
Planning Zoning Code (UPC), Buenos Aires South Corporation and Historical Preservation 
Areas (HPAs)  
 
In 1996
41
, the now neoliberalized local government directed affected the south side area by 
creating a new development plan for it. In this Urban Environmental Plan (UEP), the City 
declared that this area was to be re-made as a more vibrant social and economic place. 
The area, envisioned as a gentrified terrain, was to house more affluent people, upscale 
stores, commercial-oriented restaurants, and the like.  This area, in aesthetic, was to mirror the 
rapidly upgrading downtown of Buenos Aires. But to gain public acceptance, the area had to be 
presented as currently inadequate, lacking civility and decency, and in need of restructuring.   
Thus, in 2000, the UEC
42
  executive board circulated a document diagnosing the status of the 
south area, emphasizing its “relegated”’ and ‘”disinvested”’ condition based on the “lack of basic 
infrastructure, economic development and accessibility” (UEC, 2000: 50). Notably, this 
                                                             
41 Before 1996, the city’s urban planning and development were guided by a national law, and its mayor -then called 
‘Intendente’- was handpicked by the national executive. But since it became autonomous in 1996, as declared in its 
new constitution, citizens in Buenos Aires elect its own executive and legislative government in charge of designing 
new normative and planning strategies for the city (e.g., a new Urban Zoning and Planning Code that regulates the 
use of the land and territorial ordering). 
42
 This stands for Consejo de Planeamiento Urbano Ambiental (Urban Environmental Council). This council was 
composed of: the Secretary of Urban Planning at the Buenos Aires City Government; the Faculty of Architecture, 
Design and Urbanism and Faculty of Engineering at the University of Buenos Aires; the Council of Architects; the 
Central Society of Architects; and the Council of Engineers (Villalonga, 1997).  
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document reinforced historical and local stereotypes of the south area’s population as lacking in 
the drive to modernize and integrate into the city’s social-economic fabric.  The following media 
article summarizes this vision: “…in Buenos Aires there are two cities: one, north of the 
Rivadavia Avenue, with European characteristics; and another one, in the south, more 
proletarian and unprotected” (in Clarín, March 17, 2000). In addition, the document reported, 
“unproductive lands”, spread in this terrain, urgently needed to be restructured for future 
investment; most of them were associated with former industrial buildings and warehouses shut 
down during the 1970s’ de-industrialization period (UEC, 2000: 51). Moreover, it was said, the 
area also lacked a ‘”social integration”’ into the heart and pulse of the city (UEC, 2000: 50).   
 Once the UEC document was released, the media grounded redevelopment discussions 
that offered a rationale to normalize the physical transformation of the area (see table 6). The 
media served up two prominent imaginary spaces for all to digest: a current “infrastructurally 
deprived space” and a potential “livable robust space” (see table 6). The first space invoked the 
Buenos Aires common stereotype of the south as a “relegated”, “disinvested” and 
“unproductive” area bearing the marks of decades of de-industrialization and disinvestment 
(particularly in the case of La Boca). Physical deterioration was purportedly dominant in this 
terrain: “La Boca and San Telmo had crumbling housing, broken streets …for decades 
everything was deteriorated. La Boca and San Telmo were forgotten until they [local 
government] started the public works” (Comments from local resident, December 10, 2009). 
Moreover, renditions of an ideal space - a livable robust space - also symbolically 
suggested all the features of what the south area could be if redevelopment proceeded ahead.  To 
Lincoln (1989), such idealized images are commonly offered in redevelopment narrative. They 
communicate a sense of potential and establish what kind of community development must be 
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cultivated. In this particular case, pronouncements were afflicting. References to an “idealized 
robust space”, with robust infrastructure, good service provision, and quality housing obliterated 
the humanity from this area. This south terrain was rendered a distinctly lacking and fractured 
place that was far away from the idealized kind of community that it potentially could be. Thus, 
a  local developer, addressing the issue of community need in this south area, noted  “…the 
better livability of the neighborhoods of the north, in comparison with that of those of the south, 
may be observed in the quality of the houses, in the provision of services …, of road networks 
and transportation” (in Herzer, 2008). At its core, this idealized community of the imaginary 
reinforced s a common stereotype pervasive in Buenos Aires: the sense of a southern area 
“unsafe”, “unprotected”, and “proletarian.” A widespread stereotype this way became the 
aperture through which an expedient map of the imaginary was offered. 
As this politics proceeded ahead, the neoliberal redevelopment governance offered tools to 
restructure the area. In 2000, the city launched a private-public entity, the “Corporation South 
Buenos Aires”, with the goal to “revitalize” the area (Buenos Aires City Government, Law 470, 
August 2000). Here, the executive government transferred land and public assets to the 
Corporation without obtaining approval of the Buenos Aires Legislative Chamber. Now, the 
Corporation would have discretion to clear out, assemble, sell, and buy land for redevelopment 
purposes in a delimited polygon that comprised parts of La Boca, among other neighborhoods 
considered part of the south area
43
. As the president of the Corporation South Buenos Aires best 
put it:  
“It is important to (…) act in idle, degraded, unproductive 
areas, that impact negatively on the urban landscape. The 
corporation is a middle ground entity that, with its management, 
allows (…) to have a balance between the public and private 
                                                             
43 Delimited by: General Paz Avenue, Riachuelo river, Espania Avenue, Elvira Rawson de Dellepiane Street, Ing. 
Huergo Avenue, San Juan Avenue, Directorio Avenue, Escalada, and Alberdi Avenue  
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sector and to favor the consensus among all the intervenient 
sectors” (in La Nación, February 2, 2000).  
Ultimately, this entity acted as a public-private developer oriented to economically boost the 
buildings and lands considered “unproductive”.  
At the same time, the Código de Planeamiento Urbano (Urban Planning Zoning Code, later 
UPC) was passed. UPC efforts became focused on the south area, which was considered an “area 
of priority development” (GCBA, 2003: 6). Its main objective: “ is the development of the South. 
All the professionals coincide that in terms of planning, the city is unbalanced and that most of 
the investment has been concentrated in the north while the south keeps forgotten … We want to 
give priority to the neighborhoods of San Telmo and La Boca so that investments are put in 
here…” said Enrique Fazio, at that time, Secretary of Urban Planning (in Villalonga, 1997). In 
this context, the reforms to the code were oriented to deregulate planning rules, particularly 
changes in zoning, in order to encourage investment and generate more tax revenues
44
 (Crot, 
2006). For example, the constructability of the residential districts was enhanced through the 
reduction of planning norms and requirements such as heights and densities, and administrative 
procedures were introduced to enable developers and builders to apply for changes in zoning 
regulations (Crot, 2006: 235). In addition, to protect the original structure of critical historical 
buildings, forty “Areas de Protección Histórica” (Historical Preservation Areas, later HPA) 
were created and designated in the UPC across the city. In the south area, the HPA districts 
included the Mayo Avenue, San Telmo, and Montserrat neighborhoods (UEC, 2000: 262). With 
respect to San Telmo, the historical district included 120 hectares, between Chile, Piedras, 
Caseros, Defensa, Martin Garcia, Paseo Colon, and Brasil e Ingeniero Huergo streets, which 
were historically  tourist oriented  (La Nación, February 27, 2000).  
                                                             
44 However, it must be noted that planning rules had by no means represented a serious impediment to developers’ 
projects in the past. For instance, between 1984 and 1992, at least 770 buildings were erected as exceptions to 
planning regulations (Catenazzi, Da Representacao, & Lombardo, 2003).  
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All in all, the institutional arrangements described above constituted significant new 
“ground rules” and public incentives that helped unleash the land market from the supposedly 
previous rigid regulatory schemes.  In this sense, the governance was at the center of 
transforming the south area by defining the legal and policy conditions under which investment 
and restructuring could take place. What follows is a description of the policies and programs 
that helped change the physical form of these neighborhoods. 
 
TABLE 6: REDEVELOPMENT PROJECTS (EXAMINED THROUGH 4 DIMENSIONS OF  
ANALYSIS) 
 
La Boca and San Telmo 
Spatial Project “Infrastructurally deprived space” that can become  
”robust and livable spaces” 
Cultural project  People to be understood as “culturally-infused beings” 
Neighborhood to be understood as a ”cultural pole of 
attraction” (cultural project) 
Process-based project  A shifting punitive rhetoric towards ocupas (slang for 
squatters)   
Historically and 
geographically constituted 
project  
A-La Boca and San Telmo, and Buenos Aires-specific 
redevelopment rhetoric and practices are offered  
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New infrastructure for La Boca: riverfront renewal and attempts to renovate conventillos  
  
Next, the neoliberal redevelopment governance was ready to directly improve the physical 
infrastructure and upgrade the physical landscape in the aforementioned “infrastructurally 
deprived south”. Thus, the governance lobbied to help channel 100 million-dollars of financial-
aid credit from the Inter-American Development Bank into the area to renew its physical 
infrastructure (Herzer, 2008). Of this credit, thirty million dollars were used by local government 
to develop a series of projects. The centerpiece was infrastructure renewal and aesthetic 
renovation of La Boca’s riverfront and nearby areas, and the sanitizing of the Riachuelo (‘little 
river’) that forms the east-south border of La Boca (Herzer, 2008). To note, these plans became 
part of a wider project of urbanization of the riverbank that started in early 1990s and it extended 
from north to south (including Puerto Madero, Costanera and Retiro). Among other hydraulic 
works to control flooding in La Boca, the infrastructural renewal included elevating the 
riverbank of the Riachuelo. Originally planned for 1994, the riverfront renovations started in 
1996 and concluded in 2000 (Levit, 1998).  
Re-making the area’s physical infrastructure in this areal upgrade project also involved 
repairing sidewalks and revamping a river walk along the Riachuelo. The governance saw these 
undertakings as essential; any seriously upscaled community, it seems, needed these basic 
elements. They were a prelude for an intensive land valorizing process that could extend 
gentrification to this part of Buenos Aires. Not surprisingly, then, these works were later 
complemented with the upscaling of traditional promenades such as “Vuelta de 
Rocha”,“Caminito”, and “Paseo Garibaldi” that are local historic landmarks.   
The results were almost predictable. Taking advantage of the renewed infrastructure and 
aesthetic renovation, the local real-estate community started investing in retail shops anticipating 
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an influx of tourism and middle-incomers. Thus, la Boca experienced a real-estate boom shortly 
thereafter along the Vuelta de Rocha and Caminito streets with new cafes (4), restaurants (2), and 
gift shops (3), (Herzer, 2008). Developer “Fundación Brocca” helped note this physical 
transformation with the following quote: “La Boca has started to change its marginal destiny” 
(in Levit, 1998). In the process, middle-income households and artists were willing gentrification 
subjects. They supported this physical renovation in La Boca and identified low property prices 
as attractive opportunities to acquire warehouses, shipyards, and housing for recycling; the 
predominant purpose was to convert them into artist galleries and hostels (see Herzer, 2000). 
One of the main leaders in this artisan endeavor has been Fundación Proa. This art gallery 
moved to the neighborhood in 1996 to become the “house of culture” in La Boca (La Nación, 
March 21, 2006). In 2000, it participated in restoring the street Magallanes, coined the “artisan 
street” as at least three ateliers moved in to that street (La Nación, June 26, 2001). Later in 2008, 
with aid of developer Fundación Brocca, the art gallery expanded 150 percent, from 750 m
2
 to 
2,300 m
2   45
, distributed across three floors (La Nación, March 21, 2008). Interestingly as well, 
were the perceptions of unemployed and employed residents gathered by a study conducted in 
the area (see Di Virgilio, Lanzetta, Redondo y Rodriguez, 2000). This study noted that a low 
percentage of population feared being displaced after the renovations were announced. To the 
study, the residents interviewed valued the infrastructural work done to mitigate the floodings, 
yet, did not anticipate future increments in the property and rent values (see Di Virgilio, 2008: 
152-3).    
Ultimately, these renovations became reflected in assessed property values. Between 1998 
and 2000, the areas’ tax base increased 30 percent (La Nación, February 27, 2000).  The closer a 
                                                             
45 One square meter is equivalent to 10.76 square foot 
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parcel to the locations of redevelopment, the higher the rate of assessment.  Thus, rent in a store 
available for commercial use close to Vuelta de Rocha would cost eight times more than on 
Necochea Street, which was considered a still degraded pocket (see Di Virgilio et al., 2008). 
Now La Boca concentrates 80 percent of its retail stores in Olavarria, Vuelta de Rocha, and the 
legendary Caminito streets, showing the importance of these as touristic and commercial 
enclaves. Despite this upscaling trend and advancing investment, La Boca was still not reaching 
the average median property and rent price of the city.  
Yet, at this point, the redevelopment was internally uneven. Patches of major change were 
located within still disinvested blocks and zones that had not yet been transformed. Thus, the 
crowded conventillos area still remained essentially unchanged.  (Di Virgilio, 2000). As one 
local real-estate agent noted, “Beyond Caminito the state of housing and street is still in total 
despair [in the area], everything is difficult to upgrade here” (December 19, 2009).  
In this redevelopment, all was not so iron-fisted. Included in the redevelopment of La Boca 
was also the refurbishing and accommodation of seventeen conventillos. This started as an 
initiative to solve housing problems of 87 families in 1999 whereby the city would be in charge 
of refurbishing these buildings and each family would pay a small monthly rent to the city. Plans 
to maintain its original structure and typology (two-story buildings with a central courtyard) 
were discussed (Teran, 1999). However, efforts from the local government to provide public 
housing resulted in low levels of execution and were later abandoned due to innumerable 
conflicts over property rights among the conventillos’ dwellers (see Di Virgilio et al., 2008).  
adding to the traditional activism of housing associations. Additionally, to many, there was a 
general sensibility that the conventillos would remain untouched due to the increasing number of 
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grassroots organizations that have successfully organized the neighborhood to preserve their 
tenements since the early 1980s (e.g. Displaced of La Boca and La Boca Neighbors Association). 
Ultimately, only one tenement house was remodeled that ended up hosting 15 families 
(Teran, 1999). Yet, a last and failed attempt was executed in 2009, led by a governmental 
agency, the Instituto de Vivienda de la Ciudad (City Housing Institute). In this case, this city 
agency offered to refurbish the conventillos in exchange for a $120,000 pesos mortgage to be 
paid by the families in 360 monthly installments (Clarín, January 15, 2009).  
Finally, highway constructions contributed to the transformation of the area, connecting the 
south area of the city with the metropolitan region (La Nación, February 27, 2000). There was a 
pervasive feeling among governance actors that this south area was relatively isolated and 
needed to be more closely hooked into the city’s circuit of tourism. To gentrify and be a city 
treasure, it seemed, accessibility to the area had to increase (UEP-GCBA, 2003). With the 
assistance and financial support of the federal government, the city’s two main highways were 
expanded into the south area in 2000 (Herzer, 2008). Again, the public works were also 
celebrated by the local media, showing that the south area was finally physically changing 
despite years of disinvestment: “La Boca is changing. … a process of transformation has began, 
that in the short and midterm will entail a substantial modification of its profile, … a significant 
switch from the period of disinvestment” (Levit, 1998).  
By the early 2000s, the area was being recognized as “a community on the mend.” A 
perception of progressive real-estate and transportation interventions had gained an imprint in the 
media and the city’s mainstream; all seemed to be progressing well.  “Out of nowhere,” a 
developer commented, “a more robust and livable space seemed to be developing.” (in Arenes, 
2000). 
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Expanding and deepening cultural and aesthetic consumption initiatives: cultural heritage 
policies 
 
“The revalorization of San Telmo (…) is a fundamental 
trigger for the development of the South Area, prominent developer 
and ex Secretary of the Urban Planning Department” (in La 
Nación, February 27, 2000). 
 
“… the citizens are willing to put their heads in the cultural 
development of their neighborhoods …. This response shows that 
the neighbors push to have a cultural life” (in Arenes, 2000).  
 
In San Telmo, the redevelopment process from here had a different focus than in La Boca. 
The local governance here emphasized cultural policies and programs (“Cultural Heritage”) to 
renew San Telmo. These policies, launched in local planning, initially focused on the 
beautification, restoration, and renovation of public spaces (see Carman, 2006). Thus, a $10 
million pesos city-initiative in San Telmo beautified the promenades with cobblestones, façade 
restoration, and new lighting (Insiarte, 1999) along in Balcarce and Chile streets (Rodriguez et 
al., 2008). These renovations were done in former well-established tourist areas dotted with 
restaurants, theatres, museums, and tango venues (Gomez and Singh, 2008). By the early 2000s, 
cultural heritage policies turned to transforming degraded and abandoned areas (Gomez and 
Singh, 2008). These policies revitalized the neighborhoods in new ways: they delimited the 
“graft-onto-the established-culture” spaces that fueled the ongoing restructuring (Reich 1997).  
In the process disinvested parking lots, warehouses, homes, and lots became new redevelopment 
targets with the intent of integrating them into the established blocks of upgrading (Gomez and 
Singh, 2008). Comments by a local real-estate agent noted this:  “… there is plenty of abandoned 
houses, disinvested petit hotels, it is a sad area, [in reference to the areas beyond the Dorrego 
central square in San Telmo] very degraded... but there are more museums, ferias, cafes … those 
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are historical jewels in the neighborhood… ” (in Ostuni, 2008: 249). To this agent, the area’s 
restructuring required an integration of these elements.    
As part of the revitalization process, the governance offered two incentives to entrepreneurs 
and homeowners interested in investing and/or refurbishing residential and commercial property. 
In 1999, mortgages were offered through the City of Buenos Aires Bank which was to be paid 
back in 20 years. This incentive was intended to help homeowners buy or refurbish their houses 
in the areas delimited by the HPAs, such as Bernardo Irigoyen, Brazil, Avenida de Mayo, and 
Paseo Colon (La Nación, October 13, 1999). Paralleling this initiative, in 2000 the Subsecretary 
of Cultural Heritage introduced a tax abatement of three years to people and entrepreneurs 
interested in neighborhood living. Due to the increasing budget and number of cultural programs 
and policies launched, in 2000 the cultural heritage policies switched management to the 
Secretary of Heritage, Culture and Tourism; they had been under the management of the 
Secretary of Urban Planning since the early 1990s (Gomez and Singh, 2008). By early 2003, the 
local government reinforced the cultural heritage policies investing three million dollars in a 
program called “Programa de Recuperación del Centro Histórico del Gobierno de la Ciudad de 
Buenos Aires” (Program for the Restoration of the Historical Quarter of the Buenos Aires) 
(GCBA, 2004). This program consisted of four policies to extol the symbolic, cultural, and 
aesthetic value of the Historical Quarter and provide incentives for investment: a) tax exemption 
for protected buildings, b) free workshops to restore facades, c) programs for the heritage 
awareness, and d) promotion of cultural activities (GCBA, 2003).  
 La Boca, similarly, had cultural policies and programs launched in 2004. At the core of this 
e was the establishing of a new exhibition space with a permanent display  oriented to promoting 
art, cinema, feria preservation, tango exhibitions, and artisan work in a space known as “Usina 
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Cultural” (Cultural Plant) (La Nación, October 9, 2004). The Corporation South Buenos Aires 
helped advance this initiative. As previously noted, this institution acted as a public-private 
developer to economically boost the “unproductive lands” of the south area. Here, the 
Corporation offered one of its buildings to host this permanent exhibition, previously transferred 
to its own domain by the city government.  
At the center of these programs too was a rhetoric to extol the virtues of these policies 
(see table 6). This rhetoric – steeped in a “cultural pole” conception -- strived to normalize the 
sense of a re-made south area. This rhetoric featured a re-sculpted area as a new growth foci for 
Buenos Aires that would allow the city to flourish economically and culturally. All that Buenos 
Aires ostensibly could be – a magnetic, economically and culturally compelling city -- could be 
made possible through the redeveloping of this south area. These neighborhoods, then, would 
mirror the city growth aspirations and help this become a reality. Thus, the media noted: the 
desire is to have  …“San Telmo [be a], neighborhood of traditions, open its arms to a new wave 
of art, propelled by the Secretary of Culture that …  create[s] a cultural pole of attraction, 
meters from Plaza Dorrego” (in Lastra, 1997). To a prominent city developer, “We have culture, 
museums; we have entertainment centers with Tango and others with classical music, … 
everything that the culture does…” (in Herzer, 2008: 246). Similarly, the director of the Museum 
of Modern Art noted:  “The city of Buenos Aires government has understood that it is important 
to develop the South, and this neighborhood will be one of the major poles of attraction” (in La 
Nación, February 27, 2000).  
These pronouncements were enabled by powerful metaphors at their base. Perhaps most 
fundamental was the metaphorizing of residents as culturally desirous beings. Residents, it 
seemed, had a hunger for the very “sustenance” that this cultural infusion could provide. 
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Residents here desired this culture in an unfettered appetite that took the form of a kind of “fuel 
to sustain them”. Thus, to a builder of houses in the south area, “these people thirsted for the 
kind of cultural opportunities that the new redevelopment could provide. The city knew what they 
were doing .. it was giving people what they wanted—the historical, proud cultural traditions 
and ways of this area and the people” (December 12, 2006). A developer in the area termed the 
new redevelopment to me “a cultural movement that fed the aspirations of these south area 
residents” (December 12, 2006). More of this redevelopment, it seemed, would feed the appetite 
of a citizenry and enable the area to be functionalized to drive the new Buenos Aires 
restructuring and rejuvenation.  Identities, now, would be actualized by welcoming and 
participating in tango venues, antiquaries, ferias, cultural workshops, art galleries, museums, etc  
Results of the cultural heritage policies were remarkable: “properties for commercial use [in 
San Telmo] … increased their value by 40 percent between 1998 and 2003 (CEDEM, 2003). A 
wealth of pronouncements were offered by real-estate representatives, government officials, and 
local residents expressing that this area was prospering from these policies: “If until now San 
Telmo has been a synonym of the lowest property rates in the south of the city, (…), today [the 
neighborhood] is recovering new waves (…)” (La Nación, February 27, 2000). Many local 
homeowners also endorsed this renovation trend: “something is changing in the new 
neighborhood. The 120 hectares between Chile, Piedras, Caseros, Defensa, Martin Garcia, 
Paseo Colon, Brasil e Ingeniero Huergo are starting to see a new light” (Interview with  San 
Telmo’s residents, in La Nación, February 27, 2000). Contributing to the neighborhood 
revalorization was the influx of three million foreign tourists who visited the city in 1999 (La 
Nación, February 27, 2000). Not unexpectedly, city-wide spending (as measured by sales in all 
economic sectors) rose by 12% between 1998 and 2003 (CEDEM, 2003).  
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Commercial boom in San Telmo and La Boca: expansion of retail stores, antiquaries, hotels, and 
art galleries  
 
As discussed, since 1996, the south area advanced its physical transformation with new 
institutions and legal instruments to reactivate the land market, new infrastructure, new spaces 
for cultural and aesthetic consumption, and other incentives. Yet, the 2001-2002 economic crises 
hit the local real-estate community hard, and wiped away every porteño’s46 drop of hope for 
investment. But surprisingly after the economic crisis, unexpected favorable material conditions 
- even better than before the crisis - generated reinvestment in the south area (by developers, 
builders, and especially homeowners). Two years after the economic crisis, two major forces 
propelled this area to re-emerge as a leading edge of city redevelopment greatly reduced real-
estate market prices and the release of confiscated pre 2001deposits.  
In late 2003, the devalued national currency and the low property prices compared to other 
global cities (London, Chicago, San Pablo, Madrid) became major incentives for foreign 
investors to buy properties in San Telmo and La Boca (Herzer, 2008). This point was remarked 
by a local prominent real-estate agent: “the architecture, the bohemian spirit and the low value in 
dollars of the properties in San Telmo are irresistible for the foreign investors. In the last two 
years the number of property purchased increased in 20% and the area has become one of the 
principal sites of temporal rent for foreigners. The more expensive areas are precisely, the more 
touristic: the Dorrego Square and the Lezama Square” (in Clarín, March 15, 2005).  
After the economic crisis, San Telmo unexpectedly experienced a residential and 
commercial investment boom (Figure 22); the last one was clustered around the historic districts 
delimited by the Historic Preservation Areas (HPA). Commercial development, hotels, hostels 
(Figure 23), and restaurants also flourished in this neighborhood. Here, the middle income 
                                                             
46 Name attributed to the residents of Buenos Aires.  
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sectors that could “use” their confiscated deposits and the rise of foreign real-estate investors 
were combined with the affluence of long-term tourists to rent or buy properties in San Telmo. In 
other cases, students from different parts of Latin America were attracted by the modest rent 
prices and presence of public universities
47
 nearby this neighborhood (Herzer, 2008). 
 As the media noted: “San Telmo (…) has turned into a place preferred by tourists from 
different countries that in most cases have decided to invest in properties” (in La Nación, April 
6, 2003). “In the last few months we sold properties (…), [that] were kept by Spanish, Swiss, 
Italians (…)” (Interview with real-estate agent, in La Nación, April 6, 2003).  
 
Figure 22: Vacant apartments. Note: The word “vende” in Spanish means “sold”.  
 
 
Source: Photograph taken by the author (December 2009).  
 
 
                                                             
47 It should be noted that Argentina’s higher education is mostly free, public and highly qualified.  
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By 2003, San Telmo had registered a major increase in retail stores (CEDEM, 2006). 
Thus, in terms of hotel expansion, in less than two years, ten hotels were launched in San Telmo: 
Axel, Hotel Babel, Moreno, Ribera Sur, Telhmo Hotel, The Cocker, 1890 Hotel Boutique, and 
Mansion Vitraux. In this boom, the so called “hotel boutiques” became the most prolific and 
successful ones in combining less investment than a regular hotel (about $80,000 and $120,000 
dollars per room and the investment is approximately recovered in the 5
th
 year) with significant 
profits (Murciego, 2009). A hotel manager commented that: “The majority of investors are 
foreigners who are looking for actives that most likely won’t lose value … San Telmo together 
with Palermo, La Boca and Puerto Madero are the most demanded places by foreigners” (in 
Murciego, 2009). In 2008 developer DYPSA inaugurated “Young and Stones”, a 50-unit building; 
and in the same year, Fernandez Prieto y Asociados launched a refurbished 8-story building 
named “Palacio Raggio”, which comprised 20,000 square meters.   
The bulk of these new redevelopments became celebrated rather than contested by 
residents. A survey conducted in 2005 in approximately 473 households (Di Virgilio, 2008:158) 
revealed that 69.8 percent of the interviews supported San Telmo’s physical renewal. This 
support was said to enhance improvements in aesthetics and environment (quality of services, 
cleanness, security, facade restoration, and building and lighting improvements). Yet, for some 
of the eateries and stores that for decades had been managed by local owners, the commercial 
boom in San Telmo was not welcomed, as expressed by a local resident: “the new stores 
replaced the classic ones: hair salons, poultry stores, and pastry stores to art galleries and cloth 
shops” ( in Clarín, July 2, 2006).  
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Figure 23: Hostel sign 
 
Source: Google images on San Telmo, anonymous (2010) 
In the case of La Boca, the revitalization and revalorization of the neighborhood were 
still confined to commercial properties clustered in the tourist enclaves of Caminito and Vuelta 
de Rocha (CEDEM, 2006:15). A prominent endeavor in this period was the expansion of the art 
gallery “Fundación Proa” with the aid of developer Fundación Rocca (La Nación, March 21, 
2008) (Figure 24). This building expanded from 750 m
2
 to 2,300 m
2
, which spanned three floors. 
Yet, investment did not move out of already established reinvestment nodes Herzer, 2008), as the 
following quote from a local resident illustrates: “We’re within 5 blocks from Caminito, but that 
is another whole world. Here tourists don’t come, that’s why nobody cares how we live”, 
complained Sonia Silva (in Clarín, January 15, 2009). As discussed, in the popular imaginary La 
Boca is known as disinvested, plagued with floods, and having highly active grassroots 
organizations that discourage real-estate involvement (Smith, 1996).  
 
 
 
 
 
119 
 
Figure 24: Fundación Proa 
 
Source: www.fundacionproa.com (retrieved June 2011) 
Figure 25: Fundación Proa (2) View to the Riachuelo River 
 
Source: www.fundacionproa.org (retrieved June 2011) 
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La Boca has also maintained low residential property prices compared to the rest of the 
city. In 2001, the price per square meter dropped to 10 percent with respect to 1996. In 2003 
($253) and 2004 ($372), subsequent increases were registered although still not reaching the 
value of 1996 ($623). Real-estate agents maintained that during the post-crisis period the square 
meter was still lower than the prices before the crisis (out of 518 records taken, see Ostuni et al., 
2008). All in all, San Telmo, and to a less extent La Boca, experienced revalorization after the 
economic crisis over different land uses and should be reminded that the local homeowners 
constituted one of the main actors to advance redevelopment in the south, particularly in San 
Telmo.  
 
Neoliberal redevelopment’s subtly changing rhetoric  
 
“… neoliberalization .. is no bloodless, semi-automatic 
process, but the work of situated political actors, who along the 
way displayed just every human flaw, coupled with a share of 
vision and determination” (Peck, 2010, xii). 
 
 
If until the late1990s redevelopment projects in this south area were mostly focused on 
renewing physical infrastructure and expanding highways, then in early 2000 they were oriented 
to expanding spaces for cultural aesthetic consumption, such as historical buildings, art galleries, 
museums, tango venues, historical squares, antiquaries, etc. I have discussed how programs and 
policies such as the “cultural heritage”, as neoliberal redevelopment governance envisioned 
attracting more investment, were ultimately oriented to cultivate a notion of the neighborhoods 
as cultural poles of attraction.  
But paralleling this new orientation was a subtly revised governance rhetoric that became 
more stigmatizing of people and spaces. As redevelopment accelerated, desires to remove 
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“undesirable" people and land uses increased48. In this context, common portrayals of south area 
people and blocks became more strident, accusatory, and “revanchist.” After 2005, then, 
perceptions of greater profitability was the fuel to run these elements through a lens of pejorative  
presentation, a finding that has also been noted in other areas across urban Latin America and 
beyond (see Miraftab, 2004, 2008). Thus, the ocupas were now commonly labeled as culturally 
deficient and non-civic citizens: “.. the occupied houses keep constituting a terrible malaise, .. 
usually they are used to shelter undesirable people” (La Nación, March 29, 2000). 
An exemplary case to illustrate this rhetorical transition is the ex-orphanage center in San 
Telmo, popularly known as the PADELAI. In the late 1970s this public building was abandoned 
and in 1984 became a squatter settlement managed by impoverished and homeless families (La 
Nación, March 29, 2000). This is a complex case of shared property rights where 70 percent was 
owned by a cooperative built by the ocupas
49
, 25 percent by the local government, and 5 percent 
by both entities. Since 2005, PADELAI has been virulently represented in the south area. In 
particular, it has been identified as a community scarring element that has little role to play in a 
rejuvenating south area. The local press, for example, has identified PADELAI as “a remnant of 
a past time .. a land-use now fundamentally incompatible with the changing character of the 
area” (La Nación, March 29, 2000).  PADELAI, in the process, became a media “whipping boy” 
that had to be transformed so as to ensure that the area’s orderly redeveloping not be disrupted. 
Two years of sporadic resistance proved futile. The result was that the facility was closed in 
2005.  Without the escalating pronouncements of physical degeneration and social pathology, the 
eviction of the PADELAI would probably not have been successful.  
                                                             
48 Parallel to this, a lack of housing stock was revealed, but for low-income sectors, in a report released by the 
Institute Gino Germani, a prestigious research institute dependent on the University of Buenos Aires: 340,000 
citizens were reported with housing problems (La Nación, November 1, 1999). 
49 The residents also paid for all the public utilities since they started living there (Aldao, 1998). 
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The PADELAI building became a symbol of how a neoliberal punitive rhetoric fits this 
scenario perfectly. More land had to be cleared out to accommodate new middle incomers, retail 
stores, cultural projects, and housing investments, especially in neighborhoods where tourism 
and foreign investment were in constant flux. In 2003, it was the scene of one of the most violent 
evictions that, with tear gas and sticks, moved out 14 of the many impoverished families that 
have lived there for about 19 years (Figures 26, 27, and 28). 
 
Figure 26: Eviction of the PADELAI (February, 2003)  
 
Source: Google images on PADELAI, anonymous (2011)  
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Figure 27: PADELAI in 2003, closed by the city government  
 
Source: Google images on PADELAI, anonymous (2010)  
Figure 28: PADELAI, closed by the city government. The big sign announces the upcoming 
Spanish Cultural Center. 
 
Source: Google images on PADELAI, anonymous (2010) 
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Today, the closure of the PADELAI mirrors the reality of the area.  The 187 families living 
in the building were forcibly displaced (La Nación, February 26, 2003); the local government 
offered different compensations to the evicted individuals and families, depending on their 
former property rights and/or entitlements: Some families and individuals received vouchers, 
others received monetary compensation, and others were left without any compensation. The 
eviction took two years, and invoked a wealth of public commentary. A month after the final 
eviction, a reporter from Daily La Nación gathered some perceptions from residents about the 
neighborhood’s physical and social change: “The neighborhood has changed. The difference is 
evident. And this is noted not only by the people who occasionally visit [San Telmo’s] squares, 
exquisite antiquaries and historical coffee shops. Also this is seen by the neighbors- some of 
them living here for more than 50 years- who said to be relieved after the PADELAI (…) was 
demolished by the Buenos Aires City Government last February, 26” (La Nación, March 14, 
2003). Real-estate agents also noted that San Telmo is not as insecure now as it used to be, “it 
has been cleaned up with the tearing down of the PADELAI” (Interview, December 2009).  
Finally, in August 2009, the fortune of the PADELAI was revealed. It took only 6 days for 
the local congress to pass a bill and give the building of 5,970 square meters to the Centro 
Cultural de España (Spanish Cultural Center-later SCC) in exchange for transforming the 
building into a cultural center with only a few conditions: The center had to be revamped, and 
the SCC would be responsible for the cultural programming (see Blogspot, 2011). This initiative 
was also supported by real-estate agents, who envisioned bulky profits and an “innovative place 
for the [artistic] Latin American market” (La Nación, December 22, 2000).  
Besides causing a major public turmoil in the neighborhood, the change in this land use to a 
tourist oriented cultural center reflects the power and increased normalization of the cultural 
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heritage rhetoric. This rhetoric became a kind of aperture through which the south area could be 
restructured for more affluent habitation and more affluent consumption. As part of a growing 
movement to re-make Buenos Aires a more culturally consumable milieu for tourists and 
outsiders, the agenda was in line with the aspirations of the emergent redevelopment governance 
as it interacted across the city. In the case of La Boca, a sense of crime, pathological population, 
and crumbling houses also obliterated renditions of the conventillos. For decades, 
deindustrialization, immigration, and overcrowded buildings became associated with the 
conventillos that also attributed a “bohemian” character to La Boca (Carman, 2006; Lacarrieu, 
2008). Yet, a punitive rhetoric towards the physical settings and population immediately started 
when the Riachuelo riverfront was revamped (1996-2000) as well as later attempts to evict the 
conventillos, as previously noted (see table 2). To the local government, the evictions were 
necessary as the targeted buildings were considered in a state of despair and unhealthy conditions 
(Pizzi, 2008). Yet, the attacks to the conventillos became more acute and punitive after the 
economic crisis. One of the voices commented: “[the conventillos] are marginal places, where 
the poverty is next to the alcohol, the drug and other miseries” (Interview to real-estate agent in 
Clarín, February 03, 2004). Pathological narratives about people also filtered real-estate agent 
perceptions of the conventillos’ residents, “Everybody knows [that] in La Boca […] there’s 
people, […] that dedicate to do other things. They don’t dedicate [their time] to work (…) The 
ones who inevitably will have to abandon the neighborhood are the ones who live in occupied 
houses (…) [conventillos] the ones who don’t work, the bad people” (Interview with real-estate 
agent, July 12, 2007). Local homeowners have also widely supported these evictions. As 
discussed, a more punitive rhetoric deepened and escalated as the demand for housing was 
increasing and an influx of foreign investors was taking advantage of the favorable land market 
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prices in the south area. For example, the Daily Clarín expressed the following: “(…) the land is 
desirable in the neighborhoods that are punished by the ocupas” [Constitución, La Boca, San 
Telmo, or Montserrat] (Clarín, September 13, 2008).  
Adding to this housing controversy, people evicted from abandoned buildings have notably 
increased since 2003 coinciding with the new local administration. A total of 253 evictions were 
registered in 2008 for the entire city, affecting 1,700 families (Pizzi, 2008). As the Chief of the 
Executive Cabinet eloquently noted: “slowly and in silence, the evictions are being done” 
(Clarín, January 18, 2009). Two policies were executed to facilitate the process of eviction and 
displacement of population. In 2008, a local law that used to prohibit evictions and 
displacements for occupying abandoned public buildings
50
 was repealed. This law was 
reinforced by transferring the crimes for occupying abandoned buildings from the federal judicial 
branch to the local one, which was apparently done to more rapidly to execute the evictions 
(Clarín, January 19, 2009). Due to these modifications, the evictions marched steadily and faster 
than five years ago (Clarín, January 18, 2009). 
In closing, the PADELAI in San Telmo and conventillos in La Boca were communicated as 
one of the major “pathological and urban plagues” to the city’s cultural and integrated city 
initiative, in the form of “crumbling infrastructure”’ and ‘”undesirable population”. Suggestions, 
more explicit than before, pushed to eradicate negative cultural forms and sharpened to eradicate 
poverty and marginality.  
                                                             
50 Since the usurpation crimes got transferred to the local justice, the cases are resolved faster than when the cases 
were in the federal justice. To the City General Prosecution, out of 210 cases that entered in June 9
th
 - when the 
transfer happened - 75% were resolved in a month and only 25% took more time (Clarín, September 13, 2008).The 
trials now last less than 30 days. 
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All in all, we have seen that the redevelopment projects have been advanced, with low levels 
of contestation, if not celebrated. Yet, the PADELAI and conventillos in La Boca, as noted, are 
the exception as people fought to keep these shelters alive.  
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CHAPTER VII: 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
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This study has strived to deepen and nuance our understanding of the notion contingent 
neoliberal redevelopment governance. To enhance our understanding of this formation, I suggest 
four processes need to be recognized. First, that neoliberal redevelopment governances construct 
and use humanly made space in at least two forms (actual physical spaces and imagined mental 
spaces) to infuse its projects with form, meaning and legitimacy. Second, these formations are 
elaborate cultural projects that tap and work through common understandings of people, places, 
and processes to work. Third, these governances are fluid and evolving as they negotiate shifting 
politics, changing economic circumstances, and evolving human understandings in their places 
of interaction. Finally, these are historically-geographically specific constructions. In this study, I 
reveal that all of these four dimensions are significant to stretching our understandings of this 
formation in the settings of Chicago (the Pilsen area) and Buenos Aires (the south area).   
My results thus suggest that the widespread way to understand these governances – as trans-
locality monolithic entities --  is superficial and misleading. In much current work in urban 
geography and urban studies, these governances are treated as unproblematically generalizable 
entities across cities. Here, one city’s neoliberal redevelopment governance is essentially the 
same as all other urban redevelopment governances. Moreover, this work overwhelmingly treats 
these entities as “top down” units that gain their strength, rhetorical core, and mission from trans-
local forces that ”penetrate” the local. 
Alternatively, my work supports the notion that these governances are something very 
different: they are significantly different entities across places as locally constituted formations. 
On the ground of the local, I suggest, these formations are humanly crafted and able to achieve 
the sustenance of legitimation and reproduction. To be clear, these formations do not arise in 
isolation; they are profoundly influenced by societal structural forces. But it is in the local, I find, 
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that such forces are fundamentally mediated, made sense of, assigned distinctive meanings, and 
acted on that ultimately breaks down the traditional, simple distinction between “the local” and 
“trans-local.”        
In this context, I find that Chicago’s neoliberal redevelopment governance has been acutely 
disciplining spatial and cultural forms constituted and refined to fashion a globally competitive, 
consumption-oriented city. Anxiety and fear that the city of Chicago will not be economically 
healthy enough and able to compete with other cities in the global spectrum has driven most of 
the policies in Chicago. In this sense, gentrification, as an urban policy, has been lavishly 
extolled by the redevelopment governance as something to heal struggling neighborhoods, 
putting best cultural forms forward, and increasingly generating revenues for the city. In the 
process, Chicago’s neoliberal redevelopment governance adroitly offers key mental/imaginary 
spaces to normalize and rationalize its projects. Now neoliberal redevelopment governance 
communicates the need to upgrade “old” neighborhoods and make them “new” to fit and serve 
the city’s globally competitive project. A “new” neighborhood, to neoliberal redevelopment 
governance, is the one physically and socially transformed to an upper-income aesthetic and 
utilitarian community inhabited by civically progressive and productive people.  
These two imaginary spaces are elaborated spatial constructs that profoundly affected 
redevelopment in Pilsen. An “old” Pilsen is now rendered as a standard Chicago stereotype: a 
“ravaged-depressed space” with current high-crime, gritty, Mexican neighborhoods emblematic 
of a bygone industrial era. It has a poor, service-dependent population and a factory-era aesthetic 
that make it a relic in a postindustrial city. This old Pilsen contrasts with a “new”, potentially 
“prosperous and orderly ethnoscape” that communicates an orderly community, tranquil streets, 
sense of prosperity and cohesiveness. To this governance, gentrification would inevitably happen 
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but little would be compromised or sacrificed in this supposed long-overdue updating of Pilsen. 
These two spaces together offered a logic site for redevelopment in Pilsen to meet the needs of a 
globally-oriented city. New patterns of consumption, production, and civic responsiveness would 
renew each neighborhood and Chicago. 
Alternatively, Buenos Aires’s neoliberal redevelopment governance fits a different 
reality. This governance has mobilized a glut of public resources (physical infrastructure, public 
land, subsidies, and political power) to choreograph a distinctive culturally-driven and socially 
integrated city.  In the process, Buenos Aires’ neoliberal redevelopment governance offers 
imaginary spaces to rationalize its projects in a different way than in Chicago. Attention is 
steered to renewing the physical infrastructure and historical-cultural buildings of the long-time 
disinvested neighborhoods but without exacerbating fear and anxiety to protect the city’s 
economy and growth. La Boca and San Telmo, as seen, are rendered as less “chaotic”, “derelict” 
and “pathological spaces” than Pilsen. Common local stereotypes in La Boca and San Telmo 
infused proclamations to upgrade “infrastructurally deprived spaces” and make them “robust and 
livable spaces”. The first space has historically characterized the south area, emblematic of a 
bygone industrial area, with insufficient physical infrastructure, housing and services. It has a 
“proletariat” population and a warehouse-era aesthetic, bearing the marks of decades of de-
industrialization, disinvestment and dilapidation in the south area. The new “livable and robust 
spaces” envisions a well-serviced community (i.e. good provision of services, livable museums, 
art galleries, historical buildings, etc.) and more consumptive-oriented community. These two 
spaces together offer a logic site for redevelopment in La Boca and San Telmo. New patterns of 
cultural and aesthetic consumption would renew and socially integrate La Boca, San Telmo and 
Buenos Aires.  
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 As cultural projects, Chicago’s redevelopment governance strives to cultivate common 
understandings to contribute to the city’s economic aspiration (global project). That is, this 
governance toils to render Pilsen an authentic ethnic neighborhood (a Mexican barrio) whose 
commodification and gentrification can help push forward the city’s go-global redevelopment 
project. This rhetoric, then, extols ethnicity to make it visible and consumable as a city cultural 
good. Pilsen, as much as any neighborhood in Chicago today, illustrates this governance push to 
commodify and functionalize ethnicity to drive the city’s economic aspirations. Pronouncements 
about Pilsen as an ethnic enclave, and as the “Mexican Mecca of the Midwest”, vividly reflect of 
how this neoliberal redevelopment governance pushes to make neighborhoods functionally 
utilitarian. In the process, residents are caricatured as authentic, rooted and forever proud 
Mexican Americans (ethnic infused-beings), symbolically captured in ethnic restaurants, kind 
push-cart vendors, authentic art galleries and museums, ethnically preserved shops, and 
ritualized street fairs.   
In Buenos Aires, the neoliberal redevelopment governance negotiates and serves up 
different understandings to solidify its projects. One is most central: concerns about a 
“culturally-driven and socially integrated city” where culture constitutes a monolithic entity that 
mobilizes the city’s redevelopment, growth and social integration. In other words, Buenos Aires 
neoliberal redevelopment governance pushes to build a city that celebrates social integration 
while it deepens  and expands spaces for cultural and aesthetic consumption (considered unique, 
historical, characteristic, and prestigious) as means to attract investment. The San Telmo and La 
Boca neighborhoods, as discussed earlier, are rendered as quintessential cultural enclaves or 
“cultural poles of attraction”, authentic jewels for the city’s integration and growth. In these 
cultural enclaves, residents become “culturally-infused beings” symbolically captured in 
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historical buildings, antiquaries, workshops, tango venues and museums offered by these 
neighborhoods. 
 I also reveal that these redevelopment governances in Chicago and Buenos Aires are 
processural. These formations continuously negotiate and adjust to shifting social, political and 
economic circumstances as they plan, scheme, and conduct encounters across their city and their 
neighborhoods. Thus, their rhetoric and actions change and evolve in response to multiple things: 
changing political realities, actual contestation, morphing social times, and to new opportunities 
for redevelopment and development. This study chronicles that neoliberal operations are 
continually under contestation that are always being negotiated and responded to.  I revealed the 
shifting rhetoric of neoliberal redevelopment governance in Chicago in response to changing 
realities and contestation: new city economic realities, increased impoverishment and hunger, 
unemployment, increasing protest to stall redevelopment projects.  Disciplining ethnic 
neighborhoods through punitive/revanchist rhetoric to advance development (1990-2005), at a 
critical moment, was deemed an increasingly problematic tactic and something that needed to be 
refined. In the process, the governances showed itself to be adroit, enacting a subtly more 
humane rhetoric about people and places that could also do the bidding of its redevelopment 
designs. Thus, from (at least) 1990 to 2005, social pathologies were identified as characterizing 
the Latino community of Pilsen. However, post 2005, renditions of Pilsen Latinos progressively 
changed to introduce a more subtle, more humane person and community. Buenos Aires’ 
neoliberal redevelopment governance also adjusted its rhetoric in response to changing realities.  
Tolerant policies towards the population-ocupas-living in the abandoned buildings and 
conventillos were all but abandoned; they were proving unsuccessful as an increasingly 
unpopular narrative about local conditions. The result is that this formation turned more punitive 
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and harsh; locals and their blocks became increasingly presented as obstructions to normative 
city functioning and impediments to the public good. Even as a city-wide cultural unity and city 
heterogeneity was being espoused, governance articulations now had these people and 
neighborhoods as civic outliers who simply were not functioning as integral to “the desired city.” 
Between 2003 and 2006, suggestions, more explicit than before, pushed to eradicate abandoned 
buildings (“urban plagues”) and negative cultural forms resulting from these spaces 
(“undesirable ones”, “bad people”). Additionally, between 2007 and 2008 the number of 
evictions and displacements in the city rapidly escalated resulting in increasing levels of social 
marginality and deprivation.   
  In sum, then, I suggest that current neoliberal governances are best conceptualized as a 
series of differentiated, process-based, and space-mobilizing constructions in new political and 
economic times. These governances, in general principal, are outgrowths of new economic times 
and circumstances. In their routine operations, they are constituted and re-constituted through the 
vagaries of the situated: political cultures, economic bases, and cultural understandings. They are 
ultimately constituted and work through a dialectic of multi-scale forces that render them 
distinctly place rooted formations. Always “wearing” the imprint of societal and global 
structures, they forever refract these through sensibilities of place rooted cultures, political 
conditions, political cultures, and place-idiosyncratic meanings.   
Finally, on the public policy front, this study sheds light on critical points for public 
intervention in efforts to build a more just and sensitive oriented city. First, a more just 
redevelopment can be aggressively pursued in these cities based on the nuanced knowledge that 
this redevelopment is fundamentally locally constituted, locally driven and humanly crafted. 
Second, local culture and local space represent domains/dimensions for the construction, 
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refinement and reproduction of current redevelopment. Programs, policies and institutions 
created to modify and refine redevelopment’s form and impacts, it follows, can fruitfully work 
through these domains for desired results. Third, meaningful social change and the transforming 
of redevelopment governances often begin with something “supposedly” minor: rhetorical 
modifications of human identities and communities. For example, for public Chicago to consider 
the struggle of the Latino/racialized poor in more humane, structurally-based ways opens up 
possibilities for stepped-up mainstream criticism and discredit of ongoing redevelopment. For 
public Buenos Aires to render the ocupas in less humane and complex ways, could trigger 
movements of resistance. In fact, this resistance to eviction and displacement is currently being 
energized and has reached international scope.   
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